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FOREWORD
The American military’s mission in Iraq requires a
set of skills and outcomes that are very different than the
traditional warfighting for which soldiers are trained.
These include negotiation, a common enough human
activity that, in the context of military operations in
places like Iraq, takes on new complexity, importance,
and urgency. Negotiation has become for many military
leaders, particularly the increasingly strategically
important junior leaders, a daily task in their role of
stabilizing, securing, transitioning, and reconstructing
Iraq. Yet even given the prevalence of negotiation in the
contemporary operating environment, there has been
no systematic effort to study the negotiating experience
of the American military in Iraq or Afghanistan or to
understand negotiation’s increasingly important role
in accomplishing missions.
This monograph begins to fill the gap by analyzing
the experiences of U.S. Army and Marine Corps
officers returning from Iraq. It integrates academic
research on negotiation theory and practice with their
experience on the ground. The author challenges us to
see the tactical, operational, and strategic importance of
negotiating in an operating environment characterized
by near-constant interaction between U.S. soldiers and
the civilian and military members of the local populace.
The stability, security, transition, reconstruction, and
counterinsurgency operation the United States is
conducting in Iraq requires a different understanding
of how missions get accomplished and what defines
mission success.
The author recommends increased training in
negotiation and offers practical recommendations



for how officers can improve their negotiating
outcomes and how military trainers can supplement
predeployment training to ensure that military leaders
deploy with the skills and practice they need for what
the author argues is becoming a mission essential
task in the 21st century operating environment. The
monograph includes an outline of a suggested program
of instruction that trainers can use to prepare leaders
for deployment.
The research behind this monograph was conducted
under the auspices of the Harvard Negotiation
Research Project at the Program on Negotiation of the
Harvard Law School. It is an example of the expertise
and insight private research institutions can offer the
military community through the Strategic Studies
Institute.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
U.S. soldiers in Iraq—from junior to senior leaders—
conduct thousands of negotiations with Iraqi leaders
while pursuing tactical and operational objectives
that affect the strategic import of the U.S. mission in
that country. As long as U.S. troops operate under
conditions like the ones they currently face while at
the same time conducting a counterinsurgency and
stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR)
operation in Iraq, negotiation will be a common activity
and an important part of achieving mission objectives.
Lessons from experience negotiating in Iraq can be
helpful in future operations.
This monograph argues that the negotiations
conducted in Iraq have tactical importance, operational
significance, and strategic implications because of
the daily role they play in the missions U.S. soldiers
conduct while attempting to secure neighborhoods,
strengthen political institutions, acquire information
and intelligence, and gain cooperation. The aggregate
effect of so many successful or failed negotiations has an
impact on the ability of the U.S. military to accomplish
its operational mission there efficiently and effectively
as well as meet American strategic goals.
The armed services have centers for lessons learned,
combat training centers, and a variety of schools for
continued training and development of their soldiers
and leaders, but there has been no formal study of
the negotiating experience that U.S. military officers
and noncommissioned officers have gained and the
lessons they have learned over the course of their
tours in Iraq or Afghanistan that applies the broader
field of negotiation theory and its literature to the
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practical needs of the U.S. military in conducting those
negotiations. This monograph attempts to fill the gap
by (1) analyzing negotiations described in narrative
interviews with U.S. Army and Marine Corps officers
recently returned from deployments to Iraq, and (2)
examining the predeployment training currently
conducted at the U.S. Army’s National Training
Center.
The author argues that insofar as negotiation is a
critical skill, the U.S. military’s improvements in postconflict capabilities have not kept pace with its otherwise
impressive improvements in warfighting. The U.S.
military must better prepare itself for the new roles
its soldiers—particularly junior leaders—have been
asked to play in Iraq and will undoubtedly continue
to play in the new strategic operating environment.
Those new roles will continue to demand proficiency
in the warfighting skills soldiers need when combating
armed enemies and protecting themselves against
attack. At the same time, SSTR and counterinsurgency
operations include such constant interaction with local
civilian and military leaders that negotiation may very
well be a mission-essential task. America’s strategic
success in the future may depend on an expanded
range of training that includes negotiation skills. More
time spent preparing the military’s leaders for the
negotiating they will inevitably do while deployed
to Iraq is critical for mission success. Failure to adapt
could be costly.
In the worst case, poorly executed negotiations
actually do harm to the U.S. military’s mission by
embittering Iraqis and turning previously neutral
civilian leaders into enemies or creating more disputes
than existed before the negotiation, all while failing
even to solve the problems or achieve the objectives that
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were originally the subject of the negotiation. At their
best, U.S. military negotiators achieve U.S. objectives
while meeting the interests of their Iraqi counterparts,
build stronger working relationships with Iraqi leaders,
and engender good will among the Iraqi population.
The U.S. Army has integrated negotiation into its
predeployment training. This reflects the widespread
recognition that civil-military relations and nonkinetic
skills, including negotiation, now play an important
role in the operating environment and in Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM’s complex mission of stabilizing,
securing, transitioning, and reconstructing a country
mired in conflict. While this training is an important
development, it is not sufficient.
The skill and practice of negotiation continues to
occupy a very minor role in predeployment training.
It is far from proportional to the amount of time that
soldiers and commanders actually spend negotiating
with Iraqi civilian and military leaders or proportional
to the tactical, sometimes operational, importance
of those negotiations. Most officers interviewed said
they were not prepared for the negotiating they had
to do to accomplish their missions. As a result, this
monograph offers training recommendations that are
consistent with, and would enhance and complement,
the U.S. military’s current predeployment training in
negotiation.
The monograph provides an analysis of negotiations
between U.S. military officers and local civilian and
military leaders in Iraq’s SSTR operation. Based on the
officers’ experiences, the monograph identifies three
key elements of negotiation that exercise particular
force in SSTR operations. First is the context in
which negotiations take place and which make these
negotiations especially unique and demanding. Second,
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cultural difference is an important, but relative, factor
in such context; it can significantly affect the conduct
and outcome of a negotiation, or, more surprisingly,
have little effect. Third, the element of power is shaped
by a variety of factors unique to military SSTR and
counterinsurgency operations.
Based on these findings, the author offers
recommendations for U.S. officers to consider
when negotiating with local Iraqi leaders; for U.S.
military trainers to consider when reviewing their
predeployment negotiation training curriculum;
and for the armed forces training and doctrine
commands to consider when planning and structuring
predeployment training. These recommendations
integrate the extensive body of negotiation theory and
research with the lessons learned from the experience of
the U.S. Army and Marine Corps officers interviewed.
They include (1) negotiation tactics and techniques
that may enhance the effectiveness of U.S. soldiers
negotiating with local civilian or military leaders in
SSTR and counterinsurgency operations; and (2) ways
to supplement current U.S. military training for soldiers
preparing to deploy to SSTR operations such as those
in Iraq.
The last section of the monograph provides an
outline of a recommended program of instruction for
trainers and officers that will provide them the skills to
negotiate more effectively in SSTR operations and train
other leaders to do the same. The program of instruction
incorporates proven negotiation principles, techniques,
and methods, as well as the specific techniques and
approaches that this monograph identifies as being
particularly relevant to U.S. military negotiators in
SSTR operations.



Transformation of the U.S. military requires
adaptation to (1) the types of operations it may
continue to be called upon to perform, and (2) the shift
of strategic responsibility down to the junior leaders
on the ground. Negotiation is more likely than ever to
be a significant part of military operations. As it does,
negotiation training, education, and research will
become more important for the United States Armed
Forces. Improvement in military-civilian negotiating
will promote more tactical and operational, if not
strategic, success in the increasingly complex missions
of the 21st century.
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PART I
INTRODUCTION



The United States is engaged in two major
operations abroad in which the government’s
priorities are to establish and maintain stability and
security, affect transition to local governance and
security, and reconstruct the country’s infrastructure
and institutions. These Stability, Security, Transition,
and Reconstruction Operations (SSTR)1 in Iraq and
Afghanistan command substantial human, financial,
and intellectual resources and have challenged U.S.
institutions to think differently about the way they
have traditionally operated.
The primary instrument for achieving success in
SSTR operations is the U.S. military.2 U.S. Army and
Marine Corps support for SSTR operations on the
ground, particularly in the immediate post-conflict
environment, demonstrates their ability to adapt
to and execute a variety of missions that are often
very different from the ones for which their soldiers
have trained. For this reason, the challenges faced by
the Army and Marine Corps in Operations IRAQI
FREEDOM and its successors have begun to inform
their training efforts.
In Iraq, the proportion of time that U.S. military
units spend in nonkinetic activity relative to kinetic
operations is substantial, and, for some units in some
locations in Iraq, a significant majority of their time.3
Nonkinetic operations are a critical part of mission
success in Iraq. The prevalence of civil-military
interaction in the context of SSTR operations results
in a significant number of interactions that must be,
but are often not, characterized as negotiations. These
negotiations have tactical importance and sometimes
operational significance in Iraq because of the role
they play in most nonkinetic operations in which U.S.
soldiers are focused on such objectives as strengthening



local political institutions or securing information and
intelligence.4
They also play a role in kinetic operations. In one
way, there is more at stake in a kinetic operation than
in any one negotiation. Threats to Iraqis, U.S. troops, or
stability in general are often more immediate and lethal.
Lives are at stake. The U.S. military rightly focuses its
training efforts on preparing for kinetic operations.
Yet, there are many times when negotiations arise
amid operations that often end up turning kinetic,
such as cordon and searches, raids, checkpoints, and
even patrols. Negotiations are sometimes the last
chance to prevent some situations from turning lethal
and to solve problems in a way that poses less risk
of losing American lives or creating more enemies
than the tactical objective is worth. Even when there
is not a risk of immediate use of force, negotiations
can contribute to accomplishing stated U.S. objectives
in Iraq: supporting Iraqis in creating, establishing,
legitimizing, and running their own government and
security, as well as reducing the risks to American
soldiers.
In many cases, negotiation may be one of the
primary tools the U.S. military uses to achieve mission
objectives. As long as U.S. troops operate in Iraq and
face an insurgency and sectarian violence, negotiation
will be a common activity. More importantly, the
lessons from the military’s experience in Iraq can be
helpful in future operations with SSTR character.
The Importance of Negotiation Training
in the New Strategic Environment.
For this reason, there should be more study of and
training focused on preparation and strategy at the



tactical and operational levels for engagements that
may, in aggregate, take a significant proportion of a
unit’s time and, more importantly, have substantial
tactical value to the unit in achieving objectives in its
area of responsibility. Over time, success or failure in
these engagements has operational significance to the
U.S. military across Iraq and could even be of strategic
importance.5 The U.S. military’s improvements in
post-conflict capabilities have not, however, kept
pace with its otherwise impressive improvements in
warfighting.6
Nevertheless, the U.S. military is adapting. It has
started to train and prepare units for Iraq’s SSTR
operation in a variety of new ways. Due to the U.S.
military’s increasing awareness of the importance
of nonlethal operations, including negotiations, the
Army’s combat training centers (CTCs) have adapted
their curriculum to include a greater emphasis on such
civil-military interactions.7 Combat training centers
provide combat and mission-oriented training to
prepare units for deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan.
The CTCs primarily rely on simulation exercises that
provide the unit-in-training with experience facing the
same types of tactical problems and challenges they
might face during their upcoming mission overseas.
The training conducted by the U.S. Army’s National
Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California,
is representative of the military’s predeployment
training.8
Until just 2 years ago, the NTC focused on training
units for high-intensity conflict using brigade-sized
simulated tank battles.9 The CTCs began changing their
curriculum in the wake of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
(OIF) and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEFAfghanistan) to respond to the realities that U.S.
troops were facing in those two operations. It became


clear that the nature of the mission had changed from
invasion and quick transition to a long-term security,
stabilization, transition, and reconstruction operation
in the midst of insurgency, sectarian violence, and
terrorism.10
The U.S. Army’s current predeployment training
in negotiation provided at the NTC is an important
development reflecting the “mind-shift” within the
Army at the tactical level.11 But the skill and practice
of negotiation continues to occupy a very minor role in
predeployment training, and the time spent training for
negotiations is not proportional to the amount of time
that soldiers and commanders will spend negotiating
with Iraqi civilian and military leaders or proportional
to the tactical, sometimes operational, importance of
those negotiations.
For example, at the NTC a company commander
negotiated with the mayor of a village over the
custody of four detainees accused by the officer of
participating in an insurgent suicide bombing attack.12
The commander asked for the mayor’s cooperation.
The mayor and police chief, standing in the doorway,
would not allow U.S. soldiers to take custody. At an
impasse, the U.S. commander called his battalion
headquarters for permission to take the detainees by
force. He continued to negotiate with the mayor. An
agreement was reached under which the U.S. unit took
only one of the four prisoners. As the soldiers were
preparing to take the prisoner, the town was shelled
with insurgent mortar fire.
This negotiation—which took place in a simulated
environment but was neither staged or scripted—
demonstrates the unique, challenging environment
in which the U.S. military negotiates with civilians in
operations like Iraq. Violence and the threat and fear of



violence often exists in the background of negotiations.
The entire event was precipitated by a suicide bomber.
The negotiation was spontaneous but important to
achieving a unit’s mission objective and preventing the
situation from turning kinetic.
In this situation, negotiation was the best solution
for both the Americans and the mayor, and despite the
option of using force, the captain found a way to avoid
it through continued negotiation. The unit did not
destroy its vital relationship with the town’s civilian
leadership, yet it did not really meet its objective. This
captain deployed to Iraq in June 2006 with experience
in trying to negotiate under these circumstances, but
he did not have as much training specific to negotiation
skills as he needed to be prepared for the inevitably
large number of negotiations like this one that he
will conduct with Iraqi civilian, police, and military
leaders.
Negotiation training at the NTC focuses primarily
on battalion and brigade commanders and their staffs.
It does not include junior leaders. Yet the latter are
frequently engaged in negotiations.13 Expanding
negotiation training to include all leaders who are likely
to conduct a substantial amount of negotiation while
deployed to an SSTR operation would strengthen each
unit’s capability while executing its mission.14
The Army and Marine Corps must prepare for the
missions they will be called upon to accomplish in the
new strategic environment of the 21st century.15 The
costs are high of not adapting to the new roles soldiers
are being asked to play and will undoubtedly continue
to play in future operations.16 Those new roles will
continue to demand proficiency at the warfighting skills
soldiers need to combat armed enemies and protect
themselves against attack. There will continue to be



exclusively kinetic operations for which units must
be prepared. However, many missions inevitably will
include negotiations with civilian or military leaders. In
nation-building SSTR operations or counterinsurgency
campaigns, negotiation may very well be a mission
essential task.
In the many scenarios that cannot be anticipated,
soldiers must call upon the judgment, adaptability,
and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that the
Army or Marine Corps has trained them to use. When
it is inevitable, however, that soldiers will repeatedly
need to negotiate with civilians, it only makes sense
to train them to do it well and to provide negotiationspecific TTPs based on the experience of other soldiers
and proven theory from the field of negotiation
research.17 Strategic success in the future may depend
on such an expanded range of training.
Dedicating more time during predeployment
training to preparing these leaders to negotiate will
allow for training in techniques, methods, and theory
that are important for lasting effectiveness and mission
success. This does not ignore the military’s need to
prepare its troops for the challenging and dangerous
security situation they face in places like Iraq. Combatfocused training must always be the first priority.
Units preparing to deploy must train on tactics,
prepare equipment, and accomplish countless other
tasks before arriving in theater. Time constraints make
it difficult to introduce new training. Nevertheless,
given the important (and increasing) role in Iraq of
nonkinetic activities such as negotiations, the time
spent training soldiers to negotiate with Iraqi civilian
or military leaders should be at least commensurate
with the amount of time—relative to combat—that
they will actually spend negotiating.



If deploying leaders currently receive any
negotiation training, it is minimal. U.S. officers that
train at the NTC currently receive an approximately
4-hour-long block of instruction on negotiation. There
are many officers who do not even get the benefit of
this training. The research on which this monograph
rests—interviews of U.S. military officers—shows
that a relatively minor adjustment needs to be made
in predeployment training that would balance the
need for combat readiness with the need for nonlethal,
mission-essential skills.
In the worst case, poorly executed negotiations
may actually do harm to the U.S. military’s mission
in Iraq by embittering Iraqis and turning previously
neutral civilian leaders into enemies, creating more
disputes than existed before the negotiation, as well as
failing to solve the problems that were originally the
subject of the negotiation. At their best, U.S. military
negotiators achieve their own objectives while meeting
the interests of their Iraqi counterparts, build stronger
working relationships with Iraqi leaders, and engender
good will among the Iraqi population. In between,
negotiations may have less extreme effects, but mildly
productive outcomes and neutral effects on Iraqi
sentiment are not exactly optimal.
In the current strategic environment, every junior
leader is a “strategic corporal” and all officers, from
lieutenant to general, are expected to be especially
adaptable, flexible leaders who are prepared to
overcome obstacles and accomplish their missions
in what is often a confusing, tense, unfamiliar
environment.18 With thousands of negotiations being
conducted by U.S. soldiers in Iraq, the aggregate effect
of negotiations that damage the reputation of the U.S.
military or do not achieve the intended outcomes—or,



alternatively, of those that do—has an impact on the
ability of the U.S. military to efficiently accomplish its
operational mission there. More time spent preparing
the military’s leaders—from squad leader to field
officer—for the negotiating they will inevitably and
actually do while deployed to Iraq is critical for the
U.S. military’s mission success.19
Summary of Findings.
The armed services have centers for lessons
learned, CTCs, and a variety of schools for continued
training and development of their soldiers and
leaders, but there has been no formal study of the
negotiating experience that U.S. military officers and
noncommissioned officers (NCOs) have gained and
the lessons they have learned over the course of their
tours in Iraq or Afghanistan that applies the broader
field of negotiation theory and its literature to the
practical needs of the U.S. military in conducting
those negotiations.20 This monograph attempts to fill
the gap by (1) analyzing the negotiations described in
narrative interviews conducted in 2005 and 2006 with
officers who had recently returned from deployments
to Iraq, and (2) examining the predeployment training
currently conducted at the U.S. Army’s NTC.
Analysis of the interviews identified three key
elements in negotiations between U.S. military
officers and local civilian leaders that have particular
importance for their outcomes.21 First is the context in
which SSTR negotiations take place and which make
these negotiations especially unique and demanding.
Second, culture is an important, but relative, factor in
such context; it can significantly affect the conduct and
outcome of a negotiation, or, more surprisingly, have
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little effect. Third, the element of power is shaped by a
variety of factors unique to military SSTR operations,
particularly the tactical or operational value placed
on the relationships at stake in the negotiation. How
military negotiators exercise their negotiating power
makes a difference in how successful they are.
The author offers recommendations for U.S. officers
to consider when negotiating with local civilian
leaders, for U.S. military trainers to consider when
reviewing their predeployment negotiation training
curriculum, and for the Army and Marine Corps
training and doctrine commands to consider when
planning and structuring predeployment training.
These recommendations are based on analysis of the
interviews and on an extensive body of negotiation
literature. They include (1) negotiation tactics and
techniques that may enhance the effectiveness of U.S.
soldiers negotiating with civilian leaders in SSTR
operations—in Iraq and future SSTR operations;22 and
(2) ways to supplement current U.S. military training
for soldiers preparing to deploy to SSTR operations
such as those in Iraq.
Adopting the recommendations discussed in this
monograph will require more training, as well as more
practice and evaluation, all of which requires more time
than is currently spent training soldiers to negotiate.
Officers who are likely to be involved in or conducting
negotiations in SSTR operations should be provided
negotiation education and training lasting 2 or more
days. Those at the military’s predeployment training
centers who conduct negotiation training should
themselves have a solid foundation in negotiation
through a course at one of the military’s schools or a
civilian institution, or a 3-5 day course provided by an
experienced negotiation educator or trainer.
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The monograph first discusses the broad key
techniques or approaches to SSTR negotiations that
were developed from the interview and research
findings in each of the three areas described above.
Each section provides particular recommendations for
military negotiators that integrate negotiation research
and theory in that area with the lessons learned from
the experience of U.S. officers. The last section provides
an outline of a recommended program of instruction
for trainers and officers that will provide them the
skills to negotiate more effectively in SSTR operations
and train other leaders to do the same. The program of
instruction incorporates proven negotiation principles,
techniques, and methods, as well as the specific
techniques and approaches that this monograph
identifies as being particularly relevant to U.S. military
negotiators in SSTR operations like Iraq.
Interviews with U.S. Army and Marine Corps
Officers.
This monograph is based on interviews with U.S.
military officers. Their experience includes thousands
of negotiations in Iraq and Afghanistan conducted with
civilian Iraqi or Afghan leaders, usually local mayors,
sheiks, tribal leaders, or town council members. Some
were conducted in formal meetings, some informally
on the street. The issues negotiated reflect the entire
range of challenges and priorities that the American
military has faced and continues to face in its ongoing
mission in Iraq. Some negotiations were related to
security concerns, information about insurgents or
terrorists, cooperation in supporting elections, or
support for American and Iraqi military and police
efforts. Many negotiations were over cooperation
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with, or the scope of, reconstruction efforts. Some
negotiations involved the terms of a reconstruction or
supply contract. Others were negotiations with newlyestablished councils over governance issues in their
towns or neighborhoods. Still other negotiations were
over detainees or hostages.
The negotiations discussed by the interviewees
reflect the experience of the U.S. military throughout
the entire period of its occupation of Iraq that can be
characterized as an SSTR operation—from the time
that the U.S. declared victory in the invasion through
the current efforts to support Iraqi civilian government
and leadership and stand up Iraqi security forces.23
Except for one who spent a year in Afghanistan during
OEF, all of the officers served in Iraq during OIF-I,
OIF-II, or OIF-III. Of those who deployed to Iraq, their
time of service spans from the initial invasion in March
2003 to January 2006 and time periods in between. The
officers were mostly U.S. Army active duty officers or
former officers but also included one member of the
National Guard and three officers or former officers of
the U.S. Marines. They include infantry, field artillery,
civil affairs, transportation, and armor officers.24
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PART II
LESSONS FROM NEGOTIATING IN IRAQ:
PROVEN NEGOTIATING METHODS,
TACTICS, AND TECHNIQUES
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Consider Context, Prepare Thoroughly,
and Be Strategic.
Principles of Preparation and Context. U.S. soldiers
negotiating with civilians in SSTR operations should
prepare for negotiations as they would for any other
operation. Preparation is an important prerequisite to
negotiating effectively. That preparation should also
be strategic, which requires a thorough understanding
of the context in which the negotiation will take place.
Negotiations that take place in SSTR operations like
Iraq are dominated by the context within which they
are conducted.
It seems obvious to say that the context will
shape the negotiation and should inform an officer’s
preparation. Yet it is worth exploring further, because
the context distinguishes these negotiations from other
types of negotiations that take place in other settings.
The context makes it more difficult to apply standard
negotiation theory to these negotiations, yet the
fundamental principles described in the negotiation
theory and research still hold true for negotiations in
SSTR operations. At the same time, officers negotiating
in Iraq tend to treat negotiations too much like any
other operation, without considering the contextual
differences between them.
Therefore, when preparing for negotiations, officers
should deliberately choose a tactical approach to
conducting the interaction that takes into account the
complex negotiating context. There are many options,
but they can be grouped into four general approaches
described in the negotiation literature:
1. Focus on power: Alternatively called contending,
competition, distributive bargaining, or claiming
value.25
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2. Focus on interests: Also called problem-solving,
collaboration, integrative bargaining, or creating
value.26
3. Accommodate: Also referred to as yielding;
relevant to a party who values the relationship with his
counterpart more than the negotiation’s outcome.27
4. Avoid: Relevant when the cost of negotiating is
higher than the potential gain from the negotiation,
or when a party can achieve the same gain without
negotiating.28
There are appropriate situations for each of these
tactical choices. Generally, focusing on interests and
accommodating both offer higher chances of securing
agreement than focusing on power. On the other hand,
focusing on power offers a potentially more favorable
outcome for the stronger party if an agreement is
reached, but this approach entails several risks.29
Agreements tend to be more difficult to secure and
more difficult to enforce afterward. Whether soldiers
focus on power or not, their power in the negotiation
will still play a fundamental role in influencing the
outcome. When deciding on a tactical approach, they
should be strategic about how they demonstrate and
exercise their power.30
Officers considering which tactical approach to take
should consider the advantages and disadvantages of
each, given the particular context.31 U.S. officers should
consider the specific methods needed to execute each
approach and the effects those methods may have on the
outcome. They should also consider the relationship(s)
involved and the military unit’s priorities outside of
the negotiation that may be affected by its outcome or
the tactics used.
Analysis of the interviews provides support for one
aspect of the way the Army is now training officers prior
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to deployment, namely to prepare for a negotiation by
understanding the situation in which it takes place.32
The Army places primary emphasis on achieving
situational awareness and a thorough understanding
of its area of operations in its negotiation training for
units preparing to deploy. This focus on the context
within which military-civilian SSTR negotiations take
place is appropriate. The experience of the U.S. officers
interviewed, as well as a significant body of negotiation
research, supports this conclusion.33
Army and Marine Experience in Iraq’s Negotiating Context. A significant majority of the officers
interviewed—and all of those with the most
experience negotiating—highlighted the importance
of understanding the context.34 One Marine officer who
served as the commander of an Iraqi army base near
Tall Afar, Iraq, and negotiated often with a local sheik
noted that, “If you didn’t have a good understanding
of the situation, you were flatfooted . . . [and] could
be easily taken advantage of, manipulated, or maybe
unintentionally promise something that you couldn’t
deliver on . . . ”35 It was critical, he said, that he have
a thorough understanding of the entire situation, and
not just his own position.36 He believes that his success
was limited in a series of negotiations with a local
sheik over the use of equipment needed to enhance
security at his base, because the sheik may not have
been the right person to talk to or may not have been
someone who could be trusted.37 Other soldiers echoed
this lesson.38
Those who felt unprepared for the task of
negotiating learned the importance of understanding
the context. An armored cavalry officer expressed
what other interviewed officers also articulated: that
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in business and contractual negotiations with Iraqis,
they felt the most unprepared because they did not yet
have an understanding of the local economy, prices,
and the structure of local businesses, among the many
other situational factors.39 An infantry officer who
arrived in Iraq with the initial invasion force, and was
later assigned to civil-military tasks and information
operations, discussed—as an example of his lack of
preparation for negotiating with Iraqi civilians—a
negotiation for the use of a building needed by the U.S.
Army. As he was negotiating the rent, he realized he did
not know what an Iraqi dinar was worth. He believes
that he appeared unprepared when he had to call his
unit for the exchange rate.40 A field artillery officer who
was also in Iraq in 2003 noted that they “didn’t have
the landscape in front of us.”41 Another field artillery
officer serving in Iraq as a civil-military operations
officer in 2004 and 2005 noted his inexperience at
negotiating and his lack of knowledge about the Iraqi
economy.42
These simple examples demonstrate the complex
realities that soldiers face when they are deployed as
part of SSTR operations and have to negotiate with
civilians outside their areas of expertise and training.
Culture, of course a significant aspect of the context, is
addressed in detail in the next section.
Other negotiations demonstrate the positive
impact that an understanding of the context and
all of its variable elements can have. For the field
artillery officer who started negotiating in Iraq with
too little knowledge about the context in which he
was dealing, the time he spent negotiating hundreds
of reconstruction agreements provided him with not
only a facility at negotiating with Iraqi contractors,
but a reputation as well. That reputation among Iraqis
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reflected his improvement; contractors knew his limits
and that they could not take advantage of him.43 In
negotiations over the administration of a local hospital,
an armored cavalry officer successfully took part in
negotiations for which an appreciation of the context
was critical.44 His U.S. Army unit was responsible for
an area several miles outside of Baghdad. It negotiated
with a hospital administrator to use more hospital
resources to increase hours and services for the general
public. The administrator claimed that he did not have
enough resources, but the U.S. officers involved knew
the hospital was directing a disproportionate amount
of resources to preferential treatment for local sheiks.
These soldiers understood the social and political
context in which the hospital operated and the extent
to which it had to rely on U.S. Army financial support.
They used that knowledge to apply their own and
third-party pressure to convince the administrator to
increase the hospital’s hours and doctors.
Discussion. The examples discussed above
demonstrate how an understanding of the local area and
culture and the individuals involved in a negotiation—
the entire context—can increase one’s strength in the
negotiation.45 One officer noted the importance when
negotiating in Iraq of letting your counterpart know
that you understand the dynamics of the situation.46 If
he was trying to take advantage of you, it causes him to
lose face because the deception is brought out into the
open. All negotiations pose a risk of one party taking
advantage of another poorly informed party. For
soldiers conducting negotiations in SSTR operations
located in different countries with different cultures,
languages, currency, customs, traditions, and norms,
the potential is even greater and the need to become
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well-informed even more important. As a U.S. Army
trainer with experience negotiating in Iraq directed,
“You have to be fanatical about understanding your
area of operations. It’s what you’re going to do for the
next year of your life. You wouldn’t move into a new
house without knowing every nook and cranny of it
and getting it inspected. So why don’t you move into
negotiation with the same intensity?”47
The outcome of a military-civilian SSTR negotiation
cannot be understood without understanding the
context in which the negotiation took place. Effective
negotiation in such situations turns on the research and
preparation needed to appreciate the many particular
elements that make up the entire situation. The context
in SSTR negotiations, as in all negotiations, will have
many variables, including but not limited to different
individuals, organizations, and structural relationships;
different locations, politics, and history; different issues,
priorities, and interests; as well as cultural differences,
power dynamics, and relationships. Analysis of the
interviews conducted for this monograph strongly
suggests that these latter three elements dominate
the context of any particular military-civilian SSTR
negotiation, wielding the most influence on how
soldiers and sheiks conduct negotiations.
Negotiation “context” often encompasses more
factors and variables than traditional situational
analyses conducted by military officers for the
purpose of planning operations. When preparing for
negotiations, officers should take a broader view of the
situation than they are typically trained to take.
The military decision making process and steps
to completing a situational analysis or intelligence
preparation of the battlefield are useful starting
points for officers preparing for negotiations. The
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military has developed these sophisticated systems for
analyzing situations and developing plans to achieve
mission success. However, these frameworks prepare
commanders to make plans for sometimes very different
types of engagements than negotiations. In some cases,
they require analysis that is focused on factors that may
be irrelevant to a negotiation, while ignoring factors
that are critical to effective negotiation preparation.
Officers must adapt the steps and components of these
decisionmaking and analytical procedures to fit the
elements of negotiation.
Some components of the process do not require
much modification and can be applied to preparation
for negotiations. Developing courses of action,
wargaming them, and deciding on a course of action
can be utilized as general steps to determine the
specific negotiation techniques needed for a particular
negotiation. Mission analysis, in which an officer
understands his commander’s intent for the negotiation
or for an operation in which the negotiation takes
place, is as important for negotiation as for any other
operation. As discussed above, however, commanders
and negotiating officers must take into account the
entire context of the negotiation when developing their
intent, desired endstate, and goals for the negotiation.
In other cases, the planning process needs to be
significantly altered to fit the tactical demands of
negotiation. For instance, the orientation of the analysis
needs to be shifted from that of an operation against
an enemy to a negotiation with a party who may be
an ally, potential ally, potential enemy, or enemy,
among other possible categories. This complicates
the analysis military officers are trained to conduct.
Officers should continue to analyze their counterpart’s
most probable course of action and most dangerous
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course of action. However, in the case of negotiations,
this should rarely be within the context of an enemy
analysis. Many questions asked about “the enemy”
in a traditional planning process are not relevant and
need to be reoriented or eliminated for the purpose
of negotiation preparation. Instead, U.S. negotiators
should think about their counterpart’s interests and
priorities, constraints, strengths, weaknesses, and the
relative difference in information between the parties.
Understand, Manage, and Adapt
to Cultural Differences.
The narratives of the U.S. officers interviewed
for this monograph provide a basis for drawing
conclusions about the extent to which culture and
cultural differences influence the conduct of militarycivilian negotiations in the unique and sophisticated
context of an SSTR operation.48 All of the U.S.
officers interviewed emphasized the importance
of understanding the cultural differences that exist
between U.S. soldiers and Iraqis.49 The details of their
stories and comments revealed a more complex reality,
however—one in which cultural differences interacted
with other elements of the overall context, particularly
the way in which power was exercised, displayed, or
perceived by U.S. military negotiators. Moreover, to
say that culture is “important” does not explain how
cultural differences actually influence the way in which
U.S. soldiers and their civilian counterparts conduct
negotiation, or how the presence of culturally different
values or norms affect their strategies.50
This section proposes that:
1. The influence of culture in military-civilian SSTR
negotiations can be significant.51
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2. The influence of culture is, however, dependent
on (a) the relative influence that other elements in the
negotiation’s context exert on the parties, including the
many different cultures (e.g., national, organizational,
ethnic, tribal, political, regional, professional) at play
in a negotiation and the many interacting contextual
elements described above,52 and (b) the negotiators’
individual personalities and negotiation tactics.53
Therefore, even in the cross-cultural negotiations
of SSTR operations, cultural difference is only one
of many factors a U.S. soldier should consider when
preparing for a negotiation, and he should not allow
cultural difference to become a barrier to negotiated
agreement. Nor should cultural differences between
U.S. military negotiators and Iraqi civilians be an
excuse for a negotiation’s failure. No negotiation need
fail solely because of cultural difference.
The Effect of Cultural Differences in Negotiation.
Cultural difference can be a significant factor affecting
military-civilian negotiations in SSTR operations.54
Cultural values, norms, institutions, and ideologies that
are not shared between U.S. soldiers and Iraqi civilians
may cause each to pay different levels of attention to
the issues involved or to each other’s interests. They
may define appropriate behaviors differently and
interpret situations differently.55 Officers said that
particular cultural differences and norms, mostly
national and ethnic, affected their negotiations with
Iraqi civilian leaders by sometimes influencing what
strategies they used while negotiating. While these are
necessarily specific to Iraq, their impact on the conduct
of negotiations can be generalized to provide insight
into the dynamics of military-civilian negotiations in
SSTR operations, as well as possible tactics for, and
responses by, U.S. military negotiators.56
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Some scholars suggest that three features of culture
are related to the variability of negotiation strategy
among negotiators from different national cultures:
individualism vs. collectivism; egalitarianism vs.
hierarchy, and the low- vs. high-context norm in
communication.57 Another framework identifies five
models for understanding the ways in which relations
between military officers and others can be culturally
influenced: narrative and verbal styles, context style,
thinking and reasoning style, information processing
(ambiguity) style, and power style.58 These culturally
variable features shape the way people understand
their experiences, but they do not determine them.59
Culture is the “lens” that refracts the issues or disputes
to be negotiated.60
Some negotiator biases may be culturally variable
because the social judgments they reflect are likely
to diverge across cultures.61 Culture can influence
the availability, accessibility, and activation of the
social knowledge structures or constructs that inform
a negotiator’s cognition of the negotiation context.62
This means that negotiators may not share the same
understanding of an issue or the same framework for
thinking about the issues involved in the negotiation.
Research shows that three factors—the social context,
the tasks presented to the negotiator by the conflict or
his counterparts, and the negotiator’s state of mind—
determine whether or not such culturally determined
knowledge structures are likely to make a difference
at the bargaining table because of their cross-cultural
variation.63 These three factors can help to identify
the sources of various conditions that might affect a
negotiation by predicting conditions under which
cultural differences will be pronounced (and more
influential) or diminished. This suggests that cultural
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differences may or may not matter, depending on the
conditions under which the negotiation takes place.64
Analysis of the interviews in this monograph
suggests that negotiation theory should take neither an
entirely universalist nor relativist approach to culture
in negotiations. A universalist approach suggests that
culture does not matter at all; negotiators everywhere
share the same biases and think about conflict and
dealmaking in the same ways.65 The relativist approach
suggests that all of the biases and perspectives pertinent
to negotiation vary across cultures, preventing entirely
the application of negotiation research from one
culture to the negotiators of another culture.66 The
evidence here, along with a substantial amount of the
negotiation literature, recognizes that neither extreme
is realistic. Nevertheless, the study of cross-cultural
negotiations supports a universalistic-leaning notion
that there will often be less cultural variance in crosscultural military-civilian SSTR negotiations than is
often assumed.67
This means that U.S. officers negotiating with
Iraqis can control and manage the effect that culture
has on the negotiation.68 Several officers believed that
personality was as likely to have a powerful effect on
a negotiation as culture.69 Research arrives at the same
conclusion as analysis of the interviews: culture can
have an important effect on a negotiation but is highly
contextual and can even be manipulated, managed,
or diminished by astute and effective negotiators.70 It
may often be advantageous, for instance, to effectively
anticipate a cultural norm in order to diminish its
effect or complement it to the advantage of securing
a commitment, instead of mimicking the Iraqi
counterpart’s culture.71
A number of officers successfully managed
the conditions of the negotiations and their own
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behavior to neutralize effectively a potential barrier to
agreement posed by a cultural difference. Some simply
set the conditions of the negotiation to maximize the
possibility for an optimal outcome, given the likely
influence of a particular cultural norm of which the
officer was aware. Several of the officers demonstrated
a cultural competence derived from their extensive
study of Iraqi national and tribal culture; their astute
situational awareness of the area in which they were
operating, including the local politics and economy; and
their own personal skills. They used this to anticipate,
manage, and operate effectively in the cross-cultural
environment, often eliminating cultural difference as a
factor or barrier to agreement.
Army and Marine Experience Negotiating Across
Cultures in Iraq. Most officers said explicitly that it was
essential to understand the local customs and culture.
Many claimed it was the most important factor, saying
that understanding the culture of their counterpart
was the most important variable in negotiating
successfully. U.S. soldiers and Iraqi civilians exhibit
different notions of commitment and degrees of
willingness to make promises.72 Because of their
different ways of communicating and relating, they
interpret differently statements made to each other in
negotiations and attribute different meanings to them.
Iraqis are more likely to understand some statements
made by U.S. officers to be promises when no promise
was intended.73 U.S. officers negotiating with Iraqi
civilians therefore need a sophisticated understanding
of their cultural differences and an ability to utilize that
understanding effectively and productively.
A Marine commander stationed near Tall Afar noted
that without appreciating the culture, the nuances of
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cultural difference between Americans and Iraqis, and
the role within Iraqi culture of the sheik and tribe, “you
fail at whatever you need to do.”74 Cultural differences
have sometimes created misunderstanding and even
disgust on both sides of U.S.-Iraqi interactions.75 A
civil-military relations officer assessing the general
prerequisite of trust in Iraqi culture acknowledged that
“[t]here is not a lot of trust between men in a place like
Iraq. However, the appearance of trust (or the societal
obligation to demonstrate trust) is almost as powerful
as trust itself.”76
The officers’ descriptions of their experience
confirm that cultural differences exist between U.S.
soldiers and civilian leaders in SSTR operations, and
that culture has the potential to influence the success or
failure of a negotiation from the perspective of the U.S.
soldier. The officers emphasize that understanding the
relevant cultural styles helped them negotiate.77
Yet their experience also uniformly shows that
culture’s influence on the conduct of any given
negotiation is dependent on many other contextual
factors. The dynamic, variable interaction of factors,
such as the parties’ interests, power, constituency
demands, potential to apply force, history, politics,
psychology, personality, not to mention individual
skill and experience, means that no negotiation will
be the same. The influence that culture will have on
a negotiation depends on how these factors influence
the parties and whether they trigger culturally-specific
responses or even override the differences in cultural
values.78 Culture is not always an important factor.
A particular correlative relationship observed
across the interviews—that between power and cultural
difference—illustrates just how highly contextual the
role of culture is in negotiations, even between two
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parties as culturally different as American soldiers and
Iraqi sheiks: Cultural differences may have less effect
in a negotiation when power increases in importance,
which happens when the relative power between the
parties becomes more imbalanced.
In other words, the greater the asymmetry of power
between the parties (or perception of such), the greater
the chance that the cultural differences between them
will play less of a role in affecting how the parties
negotiate.79 The stronger party will have the power to
ignore or violate the cultural norms of the weaker party
with a lower risk of consequences. As will be discussed
in the next section, there are substantial reasons to
believe that this would rarely be a productive use of
one’s negotiating power in the context of a military’s
relatively long-term SSTR mission.80 It may also
decrease one’s power in the negotiation itself, if the
weaker party’s response leads to an increase in his
negotiating power.81 This relationship demonstrates
that the influence of cultural difference will be, or can
be, minimal in many military-civilian negotiations
beyond the cultural niceties of polite negotiators.82
The interviews further suggest that biases,
perspectives, and the many other conditions that affect
negotiation are not always different across cultures.
Often the general stereotypes of national or ethnic
cultures do not apply to individual negotiators who are
members of that national or ethnic group.83 While there
are cultural differences, there are also similarities.84 In
many cases, the social knowledge structures informed
by culture and reflecting cultural differences are not
activated in a negotiation and never become a factor.
Some of the interviewed officers demonstrated a
tendency to overemphasize the role of culture in the
negotiations they described, which may explain the
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overwhelming proportion of the officers who said
that culture was the most important factor in their
negotiations.85 The same tendencies may have reflected
information bias, a widely-studied phenomenon in
which negotiators interpret information favorably to
their side and exaggerate the other side’s position.86
Some officers understood their negotiations differently
and put culture into context.87 These latter negotiations
demonstrate how culture’s importance must necessarily
be dependent on the context of the negotiation and its
many variable factors.
Discussion. One of the major lessons from this
monograph is that U.S. soldiers operating in SSTR
environments conducting frequent negotiations with
civilian leaders in the local population must operate
with an acute awareness—based on a thorough
understanding of the culture—of the many contextual
factors that can and might influence their negotiations,
including conditions that are culturally variable
and may present cultural barriers to an agreement.
The reason for this, however, may strike many as
counterintuitive. Awareness of the situation and a
thorough understanding of an Iraqi’s culture can serve
the purpose of actually diminishing the importance of
the cultural differences between the U.S. soldier and
the Iraqi. It allows skilled negotiators to control or
manage some of these contextual factors and cultural
conditions in order to maximize the potential for an
optimal outcome.
First, soldier-negotiators operating in an SSTR
environment—as opposed to an exclusively kinetic
combat operation—must understand the culture of
their counterparts. The U.S. military’s integration of
cultural awareness into its predeployment training
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suggests its belief that cultural awareness is not only
diplomatically beneficial, but that soldiers can utilize
that knowledge tactically in a negotiation. The soldier
should not only understand the “culture” in a generic
way but should understand what cultural variables
will be potentially in play in a negotiation, given
the other factors making up the context. He should
consider what elements are present in the negotiation’s
context that may accentuate or diminish such cultural
variables.
Second, a U.S. military negotiator can use this
understanding of the cultural differences between
him and his civilian counterpart to manage his own
behavior and try to prevent activation of certain
culturally variable factors that could present an
obstacle to the negotiation.88 This requires a thorough
understanding of the other’s culture, an ability to reflect
on one’s own cultural and cognitive biases, and skill at
controlling them. In the context of peace operations,
failure to pay attention to the changing nature of
normative expectations can lead to counterproductive
consequences.89
Third, a U.S. soldier-negotiator can use his
understanding and awareness to control conditions that
may trigger the activation of his counterpart’s cultural
responses, such as setting the atmosphere, controlling
the pace, or demanding proof.90 The interviews suggest
several other ways that U.S. military negotiators could
do this in the particular setting of SSTR operations.
The unique context of SSTR operations means
that generalized theories of culture and negotiation
may not apply. Cultural norms can themselves
change in response to new social and environmental
conditions, such as the occupation of one’s country
and disintegration of political and governmental
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order and institutions.91 The changes that resulted
from OIF and the ensuing SSTR operation may have
precipitated changes in cultural norms because of
fractures in traditional attitudes and the normative
order surrounding social relationships. Some officers
noted that Iraqis adapted to the communication styles
of U.S. soldiers, diminishing the importance of certain
cultural norms. The very context of the SSTR operation
may alter the cultural skeleton of the negotiation,
influencing culture rather than culture influencing the
negotiation.92 Context may rule over culture.
A soldier’s ability to navigate the cultural dynamics
inherent in these negotiations can have an effect on
the success or failure of the negotiation. The U.S.
military is already aware of this and has embraced the
need to better understand the culture with which it
interacts in SSTR operations such as those in Iraq and
Afghanistan.93 Equally important, however, culture
will have the impact on a negotiation’s outcome that
the negotiators allow it to have or their level of skill
permits.
Exercise Power Effectively by Integrating a Focus
on Interests into the Negotiating Strategy.
The author’s interviews support and reflect the
view of negotiation theory that each party’s power in
a negotiation is highly context-dependent. Analysis
of these military-civilian SSTR negotiations confirms
that power in negotiations is “notoriously slippery.”94
On the one hand, the obviousness and overwhelming
nature of the U.S. military’s occupation as the legitimate
superior force in Iraq is a commanding factor in
negotiations with civilians.95 On the other hand, this
power is far from absolute, a reality that complicates
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the relationships between the U.S. military and Iraqi
military and civilian leaders. This is why so many
military-civilian interactions in Iraq are negotiations,
instead of one-way communications.
There is good reason to explore the particular contours
of power in SSTR negotiations. It has the potential
to provide a number of lessons for the U.S. military
conducting SSTR operations in the future, whether
in Iraq, Afghanistan, or elsewhere.96 U.S. military
negotiators will benefit tactically from thinking about
how power affects the conduct of their negotiations.
Understanding the relative balance of power between
the occupying military and corresponding civilian and
military leaders, how power is perceived and exercised
by the parties, and how the relative power of the parties
can change during the course of the negotiation may
help soldier-negotiators achieve their objectives.97
This section explores these issues but primarily
focuses on how military negotiators can be more
effective by exercising their negotiating power wisely
using two major techniques that integrate a focus on the
parties’ interests into their overall negotiation strategy.
The two techniques are (1) Start with an Interest-Based
Approach to the Negotiation, and (2) Combine Power
Moves with Interest-Based Problem-Solving.
This section discusses the principles behind these
techniques, drawing on leading research from the
field of negotiation. It then describes the experience of
U.S. military officers when they have used or failed to
use these techniques. The description focuses on how
power is constituted and actually exercised in militarycivilian SSTR negotiations, including how those officers
perceived and used their negotiating power. This leads
to discussion of how these techniques will help military
negotiators in SSTR operations be more effective in the
future.
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Start with an Interest-Based Approach
to the Negotiation.
Principles of Power in Negotiation Theory.
Negotiating power, reduced to its most elementary
form, depends on the alternative available to each party,
understood as the strength of one’s best alternative to a
negotiated agreement (BATNA).98 The power that comes
from having alternatives depends, however, on how
the parties perceive those alternatives and the other
party’s assessment of the alternatives. For this reason,
the term estimated alternative to a negotiated agreement
(EATNA) is sometimes used because it reflects the
human and cognitive complications of defining one’s
negotiating power.99 These structuralist definitions of
power are limited, however, in their ability to explain
negotiation outcomes.100 The best way to understand
the negotiating power of a party is to define it as “an
action by one party which is intended to produce
movement by another.”101
Generally, then, power is associated with the
“ability to favorably change the bargaining set.”102
The bargaining set under which a negotiator operates
is a probability distribution of different potential
outcomes.103 Of course, the bargaining set can potentially
shift in various directions. Whether a negotiator has
achieved a favorable change in the bargaining set
depends on the negotiator’s subjective beliefs about
how the negotiated outcome (that is conditional on
using a new tactic) compares with his subjective beliefs
about the outcome that would result if he did not use
the new tactic.104 This involves a comparison of the
subjective distribution of beliefs about the various
potential outcomes which are conditional on different
tactical decisions.
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This is similar to development and comparison
of courses of action (COA) and wargaming in the
Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). The U.S.
Army’s negotiation training regime at the U.S. Army
NTC focuses on a system of preparation that mirrors
the MDMP, implicitly integrating this analytical
framework into negotiation preparation. As discussed
in more detail below, however, what is too often
missing from training and pre-negotiation analyses
is an adequate understanding of the impact and role
that power will play in negotiations. Without it, the
judgments and decisions that military negotiators make
when preparing for or while conducting negotiations
too often do not lead to optimal outcomes. The correct
planning process does not necessarily always lead to
the optimal plan.
The concept of power in negotiations is complex
because power cannot be identified by just one
characteristic, and there is no general model for
explaining its role and effect in negotiations.105 There
are many different ways to define and understand
negotiation power, and different types can be used in
different settings and in different ways.106
The most widely understood type of power is
coercive power. It focuses on the ability to “win,” to get
what one wants and protect one’s interests.107 This is
the ability to convince a party to do something that is
not in the party’s interests to do, that is, to “bend the
opponent to your will.”108 Parties with poor BATNA’s
who cannot otherwise credibly persuade the other
party that their BATNA is higher than it truly is will
find themselves weaker relative to their negotiating
counterpart.109 Scholars have identified various forms
of coercive power.110 Coercive power springs from the
ability to leave the negotiation table or deprive the
opposing party of something it needs.111
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Each type of coercive power—as well as many
other forms of power discussed in the notes—exists
in military-civilian SSTR negotiations and can be
exercised by the parties. In the experience of the U.S.
military interviewees, they are used in negotiations by
both parties to their advantage.
The negotiating strength of a U.S. military officer in
an SSTR operation is not as simple as his or her BATNA
or EATNA. Power is dynamic and situational.112 It
would also be a mistake to think that a U.S. military
negotiator’s power is limited to his ability to apply
force.113 Traditional indicia of power—political power;
wealth; prestige; social influence; governmental
or statutory authority; or, most relevant to this
monograph, military superiority, control, and ability to
apply force—may not necessarily translate into power
at the negotiating table.114 A party’s power can come as
much from the making of a credible threat as from the
actual capability to carry out the threat.115 Perception
plays an important role,116 as can patience.117
A skillful negotiator can increase and exercise his
power through communicative processes that enable
him to exercise influence.118 Even with a weak BATNA,
the capacity to use what latent or potential power one
does have is itself a form of power, because it can affect
the way the other party in a negotiation behaves.119
These latter techniques of asserting power in a
negotiation are particularly important in the context of
a military-civilian interaction, where coercive power
is more likely (but not always) to be imbalanced. A
U.S. soldier negotiating in an SSTR operation should
be aware of these forms of power—not only because
he could exercise them when possible but because his
negotiating counterparts are very likely to attempt to
exercise such power.120
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A significant body of negotiation literature
recommends integrative, interest-based approaches
to negotiation that have the potential to produce
mutually beneficial outcomes that meet the interests of
both parties.121 This model focuses on the underlying
interests and priorities of the parties instead of the
positions they communicate.122
Negotiating with a power-focused stance entails
higher risks of entering into a negative conflict spiral
that may prevent achievement of an outcome desirable
to the soldier.123 The negotiation literature suggests
that negotiations dominated by a focus on power
or rights result in a contest between the parties over
who will dominate.124 This literature suggests that
such negotiations will have a higher frequency of
arguments, personal attacks, threats, and demands,
and the outcome is more likely to be one-sided.125 Most
importantly, a negotiator who focuses on power in a
negotiation is more likely to create new disputes and
leave open opportunities (and motives) for revenge.126
This increases the “costs” of an agreement and may
prevent the parties from addressing the original issues
of the negotiation. A focus on power has this effect
because communications concentrating on power—
such as threats and comments about the weakness
of the other party—are often reciprocated during a
negotiation.127 A threat prompts a threat. When such
communications are reciprocated, the negotiation has
a higher chance of becoming a negative conflict spiral,
putting a negotiated outcome in jeopardy.128
Army and Marine Experience: How Power in
Military-Civilian Negotiations is Constituted and
Exercised. It is hard to generalize about the amount
and nature of power held by the U.S. military or its
Iraqi civilian counterparts, except in two ways: First,

38

the U.S. military has and continues to have (though
in changing forms) overwhelming coercive power of
one kind—the application or threat of direct military
force, including lethal force, arrest, detention, raids,
and searches—by obvious virtue of the control that
comes with its military control of Iraq and its superior
military capability. One officer noted that,
It was unavoidable in the negotiations. It was a fact. I
walked into the negotiation with a 9mm pistol on my
hip . . . It was an unavoidable fact that my presence there
was justified only by my ability to maintain it through
violence. And that was accepted. I didn’t apologize for it
but I tried not to push people around for it.129

Second, the U.S. military operates under a number of
structural, political, and organizational constraints that
necessarily restrain its use of military power.130 These
two exceptions may not be of equal weight, however.
The experience of the interviewees suggests that the
coercive power held by the military—whether exercised
or not—is an ever-present fact in negotiations,131 while
the constraints that mitigate that power are more
dependent on the situation and context. Nevertheless,
beyond (or in spite of) these two factors, the parties
in military-civilian SSTR negotiations have varying
relative amounts of power in any given negotiation that
are constituted by a variety of factors and exercised in
many different ways.
Even though the power of the U.S. military is
mitigated by various factors in the unique context of
an SSTR operation, some military-civilian negotiations
continue to take place in an environment characterized
by the overwhelming presence of military force and
power. It is important to remember that application of
force may often remain an option and the threat of force
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may sometimes be used. Therefore, when studying the
negotiating experience of U.S. soldiers, it made sense
to pay particular attention to the role that force plays in
their negotiating power, the perception of their power
in negotiations with civilians, and the tactical decisions
they made in exercising that power.
Analysis of the interviews shows that officers
negotiating in Iraq sometimes conducted negotiations
in which their power was substantially greater than the
power of their Iraqi counterpart. Or that they perceived
their power to be significantly greater. In such cases, the
U.S. negotiators often exercised their disproportionate
power by demanding agreement on their terms.132 This
is consistent with negotiation research suggesting that
parties with more coercive power tend to exercise that
power.133 However, the negotiations described in the
interviews rarely included the direct use or threat of
military force. Only one included any use or threat
of force: a sheik’s initial detention during a raid and
the later threat of his arrest during negotiations.134 In a
larger sample, there are likely to be more such uses or
threats of force as a way of exercising power.
The interviews suggest instead that it is much
more common for officers to use indicia of force
to demonstrate their ability to exercise force as an
alternative to negotiation, hoping thereby to increase
or bolster their negotiating power.135 One officer
arrived at a negotiation with a deliberately over-sized
contingent of soldiers as a show of force to demonstrate
his seriousness.136 Another threatened at the end of a
negotiation that if his Iraqi counterparts did not fulfill
the commitments made during the negotiation, he
would return the next day with a lot of soldiers, and
“we will discuss this again.”137 In a negotiation with the
director of an electric power station that supplied his
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base but had not been providing power consistently,
the base commander first asked for and listened to
the director’s reasons why his workers were cutting
off the base’s power. He then responded by trying to
guarantee their safety from insurgent threats, but he
added that if his safety guarantee was not effective in
restoring power to the base, he would resort to force
and permanently occupy the power station.138
While these negotiations did not include the use of
actual force, they included explicit or implicit threats
of force. In these instances, the officers were trying to
take tactical advantage of what they perceived to be
asymmetric power in their favor by influencing the
perceptions of their counterparts. In many cases, the
negotiations led to successful agreements that satisfied
the U.S. military negotiator. This supports relatively
new research findings that power asymmetry may
actually lead to negotiations that are more efficient and
effective than ones characterized by near-symmetric
power.139 Sometimes the results were not as clear,
however.
When a civil-military operations unit of the Fourth
Infantry Division was attacked just north of Baghdad in
August 2003 after 2 1/2 months of peaceful operations,
the commander called a city council meeting of the
local sheiks.140 “It [relations between the U.S. Army
unit and local Iraqi leaders] didn’t really become a
negotiation after the attacks started. It was more of a
finger proverbially in the chest.”141 The sheiks were told
that such attacks were unacceptable, and that they were
expected to provide information on who had committed
the attacks and to cooperate with the U.S. forces in the
area to prevent future ones. The captain involved had a
difficult time calling it a negotiation, because of security
issues it was “very much one way.”142 The conduct of
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this negotiation, and the series of related negotiations
between local sheiks and officers from the unit, was
affected by the U.S. soldiers’ perception of their power
in that particular context. The interview makes clear
that the source of that perception was the obvious fact
that the U.S. Army was the legitimate military force in
the area.143 The perception of how this translates into
power in the negotiation is worth exploring.144
According to this perception, the U.S. negotiator’s
power was constituted primarily, if not exclusively,
by the potential to apply force of some kind, and was
much greater than that held by the Iraqis. In fact,
because it necessarily assumes that the U.S. military
has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, the
sheiks were perceived as being relatively weak.
The parties’ perceptions play a critical role
in this relationship between military force and
negotiating power.145 The potential for cognitive
bias in these perceptions is significant. Cognitive
biases are psychological effects that cause errors in
memory, information processing, social judgment, and
problem-solving. This monograph does not address
the substantial body of research on cognitive bias in
negotiation or attempt to apply it to the negotiations
discussed by the interviewed officers, but it is important
to note the likelihood that in at least some cases and
possibly this one, a U.S. soldier may overestimate his
negotiating power and mistake his ability to apply
force (which he may have) for the power to demand
concessions in a negotiation (which he may find out he
does not have).146
In negotiations laced with the kinds of opportunities
for cognitive bias that both cultural differences and
military power present in especially tempting ways, an
awareness of the existence, challenges, and effects of
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cognitive bias may be especially important to those U.S.
military negotiators or trainers interested in improving
their negotiating effectiveness and success.147
The use of military force in an SSTR operation can
be charted on a continuum showing how the nature
of operations changes as an SSTR operation matures.148
At the beginning of the continuum, the military is
primarily concerned with security and stabilization,
which will involve basic reconstruction of essential
infrastructure and humanitarian aid but will mostly be
concerned with securing the country. There are more
kinetic operations and a higher chance that lethal force
will be used. As the operation progresses, security
continues to be a priority, but the mix of activities
changes from primarily security-focused objectives to
transition and reconstruction activities, which include
operations to construct schools and hospitals; train
new security forces; and establish, supervise, and
coordinate with local civil government. In this context,
direct military force is not used or threatened as much,
even though any potential force that the military could
apply continues to be an obvious fact.149
SSTR operations are challenging because
stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction
may take place concurrently. In the context of what
otherwise would be reconstruction, for instance, a
legitimate need to use force may arise for security-based
reasons. In some locations, the military may still be
performing a more traditional security operation, and
in others, it may be executing primarily a reconstruction
and transition mission. Nevertheless, for the purposes
of studying negotiations that take place in SSTR
operations, any particular negotiation can be placed
on the continuum according to its immediate context
and the particular mix of security, reconstruction, and
transition activities taking place.
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The interviews show that the issue of force is a
factor in the balance of power between the parties to a
negotiation to a greater or lesser extent depending on
how close to kinetic operations that negotiation falls
on the SSTR continuum. The closer a negotiation is on
the continuum to combat operations, the greater the
chance that the soldier will perceive himself to have
more power in the negotiation and the more likely
it is that his Iraqi counterpart will believe the same
thing.150 The threat will be more credible. But these
perceptions are likely to be different the farther away
the negotiation is from kinetic operations and the more
closely involved it is to transition and reconstruction
operations, so that the threat of direct military force
will have less influence in constituting the U.S. military
negotiator’s power in a negotiation with an Iraqi
leader.151 In this case, the negotiating power of the U.S.
soldier is more likely to be constituted by factors other
than his ability to apply lethal force.152 In particular,
the most significant role in constraining the soldier’s
exercise of his otherwise asymmetric military power
is most likely played by the increasing importance of
relationships as operations change from lethal combat
to reconstruction.153
Still, the interviews suggest that U.S. soldiers
negotiating with Iraqi civilian leaders tend to think
of their negotiating power as constituted primarily
by their military power, even in situations when their
power in a negotiation may not match their ability to
apply military power. In other words, soldiers often
think too narrowly of their power in a negotiation as
being mostly made up of the “power” with which they
are most familiar: the power they can exert militarily.
Yet a structural analysis of the issues and context of
the negotiations discussed by the officers leads to the
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conclusion that even if the negotiation takes place only
because the U.S. military has the capability to assert its
power through force,154 the negotiating power that the
military holds is constituted by a complex interaction of
factors.155 The U.S. military negotiator is not guaranteed
to achieve his intended outcome.156
This negotiation principle manifests itself frequently
in Iraq. Interviewees described numerous negotiations
in which their Iraqi counterpart would concede to their
demand or request because the officer was exerting
pressure via his military power. The Iraqi would not
actually execute the agreement, however. Many of the
officers saw this as a lack of integrity or a reason to
mistrust, when in reality there may just have been a
failure of true agreement. The U.S. negotiator failed to
accomplish the mission because he did not focus on the
Iraqi’s underlying interests and find with that civilian
leader an agreement that truly met his interests, one on
which he would want to follow through. The apparent
disconnect between most officers’ understanding
of their negotiating power and the power they may
actually have had suggests the need for additional
training.
Discussion. When choosing a strategy for how
to approach a negotiation in an SSTR operation, U.S.
military negotiators should try an integrative, interestbased approach that seeks to secure agreement by
satisfying the interests of both the soldier and his
counterpart. It will not always be an appropriate
strategy for the U.S. military negotiator.157 Nor does
it mean that U.S. soldiers should not prepare for and
think about the power dynamics of a negotiation;
rather, just the opposite. When preparing, they should
consider the parties’ negotiating power in all its forms
and decide beforehand how they will exercise their
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power.158 Given the role that power and force play in
military-civilian SSTR negotiations, it is unrealistic to
think that such negotiations can be conducted using an
exclusively interest-based approach. At the same time,
integrative negotiation strategy has a lot to offer U.S.
soldiers conducting negotiations.
When a negotiated outcome is not necessary for
the U.S. military, the increased chance of failing to
reach a negotiated outcome that accompanies a focus
on power may be acceptable.159 Likewise, a onesided result may achieve the U.S. soldier’s immediate
negotiation objective. However, when the U.S. military
needs a negotiated outcome because it will not resort
to force, cannot accomplish the objective without
Iraqi cooperation, or because it places tactical value
on its relationship or good will with the Iraqi leader,
a decision to focus in the negotiation on the parties’
power is likely to be a short-sighted choice.
A military-civilian negotiation in Iraq that creates
new disputes, grudges, and motives for revenge—
because one side communicated in terms of power,
to the neglect of the other side’s interests, causing
a negative conflict spiral—may cost more in the
medium or long term than the short term success was
worth.160 U.S. commanders seem to recognize this,
but the interviews conducted for this monograph and
observations of training at the NTC suggest that such
recognition may not necessarily mean that they use
negotiating tactics and techniques that are most likely
to apply that knowledge effectively.
An analysis of the interviews supports the above
findings from the negotiation literature. One officer
noted that “[m]y approach became much more stern
and direct as time passed. I came off as naive and
powerless in initial engagements, but was definitely a
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person with which to deal at the end of the year . . . ”
But were the changes successful? “Sometimes, yes;
sometimes, no . . . But most of the time, [my approach
led] to delays and shameful grudges.”161
It is possible that “delays and shameful grudges”
may be a necessary and acceptable collateral effect of
a successful negotiation.162 A tactical approach to an
engagement that causes such effects is risky, however,
and it is likely to operate against the U.S. military’s
interest in cultivating or maintaining cooperative,
positive, or at least neutral, relationships with Iraqi
civilians in an SSTR operation that requires the support
and good will of the civilian population to secure the
country against insurgents, terrorists, and sectarian
fighters.163 This is why the U.S. military’s relationships
with civilians in an SSTR operation have an important
influence on a soldier-negotiator’s power and the
conduct of military-civilian negotiations in general.
U.S. Army and Marine negotiators should consider
deemphasizing their military power and focus instead
on ways to satisfy both parties’ genuine interests.164
When choosing an overall negotiating strategy,
the U.S. military negotiator runs little risk by opening
with a focus on interests, because it does not mean he
has to make any substantive or tactical concessions
or admissions.165 The circumstances of a negotiation
are often such that a focus on interests, in addition
to or instead of an exclusive focus on power, would
be a more potent negotiating strategy with several
benefits.166 This recommendation assumes that the U.S.
military negotiator will continue to stay attuned to the
cultural dimension of the negotiation, as well as the
multifaceted context of the environment.167
Relationships among the parties play an
important role in the interest-based model, making it
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a particularly powerful framework for negotiations
between U.S. soldiers and civilians in SSTR operations.
This is especially true in Iraq, where the value placed
on relationships is high—both by the culture of the
civilians and the mission objectives of the military.
Relationships are an important element of successful
negotiation across cultures.168 They can be assets. But
they become even more influential in a negotiation
when a long-term working relationship is an objective
of the military commander. A focus on interests is so
important in this context because finishing a negotiation
by satisfying the Iraqi leader’s interests instead of
his negotiating demands (which may be no more
than bargaining tactics) is more likely to contribute
positively to the long-term relationship.
A simple but effective technique to accomplish this
is to listen for the party’s underlying interests behind
its positional demands. By listening to his civilian
counterpart and asking questions, a U.S. military
negotiator can better understand the civilian leader’s
true interests and can leverage that understanding
to structure an agreement that achieves his unit’s
objective. Such a result can also be helpful in cultivating
a productive relationship with the civilian leader.169
One of the officers interviewed noted the importance
of listening, and another acknowledged that if he
had asked more questions to better understand his
counterpart’s motivations, subsequent negotiations
may have been easier.170
Combine Power Moves with Interest-Based
Problem Solving.
Negotiations in SSTR operations can accommodate
the exploration and discussion of parties’ interests, even
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in the shadow of military force and power. Introducing
a focus on interests into a negotiation can increase a
soldier’s effectiveness and improve his outcome. This
requires the soldier to view his negotiating power
as constituted by more than just his military power.
To be most effective, he must be willing and able to
deliberately combine the exercise of power and military
muscle with a genuine attempt to meet his civilian
counterpart’s interests.
Principles of Interests, Rights, and Power in SSTR
Negotiations. Negotiations conducted in the context
of an SSTR operation are consistent with the theory
that interests, rights, and power exist concurrently in
negotiations, and that the parties may choose to focus
on one of them, or cycle among the three, during the
course of the negotiation.171 In this framework, interests
are discussed and reconciled in the context of the
parties’ rights and power, while rights are determined
and settled in the context of the power each party
holds.172 The parties can make a tactical choice to focus
on one of these elements, but research suggests that
parties move frequently among interests, rights, and
power foci in the same negotiation.173
Several officers interviewed used this approach
with apparent success. It supports the view of one
senior officer that civilians in SSTR negotiations know
the U.S. military has the power to make them do
something, but the talent and art of it is making them
want to do it without using force. With force, there are
repercussions.174
Army and Marine Experience: Successfully
Combining Interests and Power. The discussion above
concentrated on negotiations in which the U.S soldier
focuses primarily on his power (or perceived power),
using negotiating power constituted mostly by his
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military power to coerce his Iraqi counterpart into
agreement on the American’s terms. However, many
of the negotiations discussed by the officers exhibited
a cycling between interests and power, if not also of
rights. This reflects a more subtle balance and use of
power. Experience confirms that it is also more effective
in achieving desired negotiation outcomes.
For instance, several negotiations documented in
the interviews concerned the U.S. military’s need for
information from local sheiks, on the one hand, and the
sheik’s requests for fewer raids and searches of homes,
on the other hand. In one example, a civil-military
operations officer participated in a negotiation with a
neighborhood advisory council (NAC) in Baghdad.175
The sheiks’ demand appears to have been rooted in
their interests and in a claim of right to be free from
frequent raids. The U.S. military negotiators addressed
the sheiks’ concerns in a way that could be characterized
as a claim of the right to search houses whenever it had
information that insurgents or weapons were present.
This right was, of course, bound up inextricably with
the U.S. Army’s power to raid houses. The U.S. officer’s
statement that the raids would continue as long as his
unit believed they were necessary relies on the military’s
coercive power to search. Interestingly, the negotiation
cycled back to interests as the U.S. negotiators offered
a solution seemingly based on the two parties’ interests.
The U.S. Army’s primary interest was in getting specific
and correct information on insurgents, which would
lead to fewer and more targeted raids in the sheiks’
neighborhoods, thereby meeting the sheik’s interests
in less disruption of their constituencies. Consistent
with the interest, rights, and power framework of
negotiations, this interest-based solution was offered
in the explicit and looming shadow of military power.
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While NAC’s often rejected such solutions publicly,
members often gave information to American forces
soon thereafter.176
Similarly a Marine junior officer negotiated by
focusing both on power and interests. He spent 10 days
welcoming and meeting residents as they returned to
Fallujah after U.S. and Iraqi forces had cleared the city
of insurgents and in the process effectively destroying
or damaging most of the city’s buildings and houses.177
Residents scared of and angry at both U.S. forces and
insurgents were reluctant to give information to U.S.
soldiers about insurgent activity and membership. In a
still-tense security environment heavily characterized
by military power, the officer reminded the residents
that the only way to free themselves from both
insurgent violence and intimidation as well as
intensive U.S. occupation was to give U.S. soldiers
information to help them defeat insurgents and keep
them out of Fallujah.178 This type of interaction fits into
the expanding field of information operations, but it is
also an example of an extended negotiation with the
local population.
This negotiating tactic emphasized the interests
of the Iraqi residents in an attempt to persuade them
that their interests would be best served by giving
him information. As in the negotiation above, he did
this while subtly presenting the specter of continuing
and overwhelming U.S. military power embedded
throughout their city. The Marine’s negotiating power
was at once limited and enhanced by the residents’
interests in ridding themselves of both insurgents and
Americans. On the one hand, his military power did
not mean the ability to get what he really needed by
simply asking: information. It may have weakened
his bargaining position because of Iraqi resentment.
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Many residents did not provide any information.179
On the other hand, by cycling through both interests
and power, this Marine was successful at encouraging
many residents to provide information because they
agreed that it aligned with their interests, even if
they were not happy to cooperate.180 By doing this, he
exercised power that was constituted not by his ability
to coerce but by his willingness to engage the interests
underneath Iraqi frustration with the American
presence, by his personal ability to persuade, and by
his skill at quickly building rapport.
All of the negotiations described in the interviews
reflect the complexity of SSTR operations and reinforce
the premise that the relative negotiating power of the
parties depends on numerous dynamic interdependent
factors. The negotiating power of U.S. soldiers is far
from absolute.
Discussion. As the experiences above demonstrate,
negotiations in Iraq were successful when they combined the parties’ power with attention to the parties’
interests. A combined strategy that deliberately cycles
between a focus on power and a focus on interests
may be the best way to avoid negative conflict spirals,
unintended consequences, and counterproductive
negotiation outcomes.181 It may also be the most realistic
approach in the context of SSTR negotiations.
The approach recognizes that: (a) reciprocal reactions
may be instinctive and therefore difficult to avoid; (b)
that ineffective techniques and efforts are commonly
repeated, especially under stressful conditions, despite
a negotiator’s intellectual knowledge that such efforts
continue to fail;182 (c) that many U.S. military negotiators
may be particularly averse to avoiding altogether the
reciprocation of threats out of fear that it demonstrates
weakness; and (d) that SSTR negotiations take place in
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militarized, power-saturated environments in which
“power” is likely, if not inevitably, to play a significant
role in negotiations. The approach is flexible enough to
be applied in any negotiation, regardless of the issues
or people involved. It avoids simplistic approaches that
advocate either a “win-win” or “win-lose” approach to
negotiation.183
Executing a negotiation strategy that includes
a focus on interests will not be successful unless the
military negotiator also employs techniques to avoid
being drawn into a downward spiral over who has
more power.184 Competitive or adversarial tactics,
particularly actual or threatened use of force, usually
lead to reciprocation with like-kind tactics, conflict
spirals, and escalation.185 Many negotiators make the
mistake of reciprocating as a reaction to rights- and
power-based threats because they fear appearing
weak.
Yet reciprocation is likely to be highly unproductive
for the U.S. military negotiator and lead to damaged
relationships, grudges, obstruction of the agreement’s
execution, or no agreement at all.186 This does not mean
that a U.S. military negotiator has to concede anything,
make unilateral concessions, or show any weakness.
By avoiding the trap of a negative conflict spiral, the
U.S. military negotiator demonstrates strength.187 Iraqi
civilian leaders who know that U.S. military negotiators
are likely to reciprocate threats and power-based
communication may use threats or extreme demands
as a tactic to derail or hijack the negotiation, obstruct
an agreement, or test the U.S. negotiator. The solution
is not to respond more forcefully, as was suggested
to an officer by one trainer at the NTC, but to avoid
reciprocating, to maintain one’s negotiation strategy,
and to redirect the discussion back to potential solutions
to the dispute or options for an agreement.
53

This recommendation means that U.S. soldiers
should, when faced with a counterpart who makes a
rights- or power-based threat or demand, reciprocate
the power threat in as noncontentious a way as possible
and simultaneously add a statement, question, or hint
that opens the negotiation to a discussion of interests.188
Combining power and interests in the same statement
pairs a credible threat with a specific way for the other
party to pursue the positive consequence of agreement
rather than only avoid the negative result of the threat’s
outcome.189 This provides the soldier’s counterpart
a way to save face, defuse, or “turn off” the power
threat, and come to an agreement with which he can
be generally satisfied. The soldier will often want
the threat to be defused rather than have to carry it
out, because carrying out the threat means losing the
leverage the threat provided. This decreases the U.S.
military negotiator’s power; it does not strengthen
it.190
This approach could be understood as a combination
of coercive and reward power, but to be most effective,
the “reward” offered must be based on the counterpart’s
true interests.191 Adversarial tactics rarely help expand
the possibilities of positive outcomes, although they
may be sufficient if the proverbial pie truly is fixed.
Cooperative moves, on the other hand, offer the
possibility of increasing the positive outcomes desirable
to the U.S. military negotiator. By combining a focus
on power with a focus on interests, a U.S. soldier is
likely to manage more effectively the tension between
the adversarial impulse to make demands (and have
Iraqi counterparts meet those demands) and the
collaborative impulse to find creative, broader-based
solutions.192
A conscious effort to negotiate in this way will
provide the U.S. military negotiator in an SSTR opera54

tion with a better chance at achieving not only his
short-term objectives but securing opportunities and
gains that come with stronger working relationships and
more genuinely satisfied negotiating counterparts.
The Role of Relationships in Military-Civilian
SSTR Negotiations.
Principles of Relationships in SSTR Negotiations.
There are two important principles that should help
to govern a military negotiator’s planning when
negotiating with civilian or military leaders in SSTR
operations. First, the value placed by the relevant
military decisionmaker on the relationship(s) at stake
in a negotiation has an effect on the way that the
U.S. military negotiator approaches and conducts
the negotiation.193 It has the potential to weaken the
negotiating power of the U.S. soldier because the value
placed on a positive relationship may limit his tactical
negotiating options as well as his alternatives to a
negotiated agreement. To the extent his negotiating
power is constituted by his military power or ability
to use force, it will be constrained considerably by
placing priority on maintaining a positive working
relationship. A U.S. commander may be less likely to
threaten a mayor when a relationship with the mayor
is important for the commander’s operations in the
area. On the other hand, the importance of a positive
relationship to the negotiation may increase the U.S.
soldier’s negotiating power by enabling him to exercise
influence through the relationship that he otherwise
could not have exercised.194
Second, a soldier’s relationship with a civilian leader
should be deliberate and managed. This is particularly
true with hostile or adversarial parties. U.S. officers
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negotiating with Iraqi civilians should take care not
to place too high a priority on the relationship at the
expense of the mission. They should be strategic when
considering how to treat the relationship during the
negotiation.
Army and Marine Experience: Managing Relationships. A little more than half of the officers interviewed said that relationships played an important
role in their negotiations. This is little more than a
recognition that the military-civilian negotiations
they were conducting were embedded in the social,
political, and institutional relationships created by
the nature of the SSTR operation.195 In some cases, a
relationship of some sort is a prerequisite to engaging
in even the most noncontentious negotiation.196 In
other cases, the cultivation and maintenance of good
working relationships was important to productive
reconstruction efforts, governance, and efficient
operations.197
In still more cases, the relationship itself was a
negotiation objective, sometimes taking priority over
other potential outcomes.198 This, despite the fact that
some negotiations took place between U.S. military
personnel and Iraqis who negotiated only because the
Americans had “the firepower.”199 During his time in
Iraq, a U.S. Marine officer became more confident and
effective in his negotiations with a local sheik because he
negotiated with him repeatedly.200 When a relationship
between a U.S. soldier and an Iraqi is long term, which
many are, the value placed on that relationship has an
important effect on the negotiation.201
With thousands of negotiations conducted by
thousands of U.S. soldiers across Iraq, it is not
entirely surprising that some officers conclude that
the relationship was “paramount” in almost every
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single negotiation,202 while others did not think
that relationships were always important.203 U.S.
engagement in Iraq evolved from an invasion and quick
transition operation to a longer-term SSTR operation
in which long-term relationships do matter to the
American military’s ability to successfully accomplish
its various missions in Iraq. As one of the officers put
it, “[I]nterpersonal relationships will continue to be an
important part of warfare.” 204 One officer believes that
the extensive network of relationships with Iraqis that
he developed during his year serving as a civil-military
operations officer in the Yarmouk neighborhood of
Baghdad became a source of power that he was able
to turn into successful, productive reconstruction
efforts.205
When negotiating with hostile or adversarial
parties, one officer suggested that it was as important
to establish the boundaries of the relationship as to
build a cooperative or friendly one.206 This may be a
tactic necessary to efficiently frame the negotiation and
adjust the hostile party’s misperceptions of their relative
position in the negotiation.207 It could be understood
as a tactic on the part of the U.S. military negotiator
to assert his strength and establish a favorable power
framework for the negotiation. Or it could be a symptom
of what has been termed “intergroup paranoia” based
on beliefs—whether true, false, or exaggerated—that
may, in the worst case, cause irrational distrust and, in
the best case, hinder the cultivation and sustenance of
the trust that even a distrustful negotiator recognizes
would be beneficial.208 Heightened suspicion causes
negotiators to approach their counterparts with a
presumptive distrust.209 Several officers discussed this
challenge to the cultivation and maintenance of trust in
their negotiations with Iraqi civilians, and it is worth
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noting that the negotiation literature supports the
observations made by the officers.210
A Marine commander negotiated frequently with
the same local sheik of a town nearby his base. He
needed heavy equipment from the town to improve the
base’s security perimeter.211 The Marine had the power
to demand the equipment and the military capability
to seize it. However, the commander’s interests and
the relationship at stake interacted in a more complex
way with the respective negotiating power of both
commander and sheik. It led the Marine to negotiate
differently. The commander never demanded the
equipment. Even though the base’s security was at
stake, the commander did not resort to force or assert
the military power to take the equipment. Instead he
allowed the sheik to exercise considerable power in
withholding the equipment for several weeks, even
though he “desperately” needed it.212
What appears to have mitigated the commander’s
exercise of his military power was the priority he
placed on cultivating and maintaining a cooperative,
positive relationship not based on the applied force of
military occupation. He perceived this relationship to
be important for two reasons: First, the commander
feared that the sheik was or could be networked into
the insurgency and could increase the danger to U.S.
and Iraqi forces operating near and in his town.213 Many
of the officers cited this or a similar consideration.214
Second, the relationship may itself have been important
to obtaining the equipment, and a stronger relationship
with the sheik may have actually translated into
more negotiating power if used effectively.215 For the
commander, this was a frustrating negotiation with
limited success, but throughout the negotiation he
continued to maintain the kind of relationship with the
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sheik that he believed was a tactical priority because of
long-term security concerns.
Discussion. The interviews indicate that U.S.
officers are acutely aware of the importance of their
relationships with local civilian leaders and are highly
cautious about damaging those long-term relationships
or violating cultural norms, even at the potential
expense of short-term objectives, the accomplishment
of which may require tactics that are inconsistent with
the maintenance of a positive relationship.216 In order
to maintain a relationship, for instance, a commander
may have to let a sheik “win” in front of his people,
while achieving the commander’s immediate objective
would require the breach of a cultural norm certain
to alienate the sheik. This conclusion comes with
numerous caveats.217 It often depends on what
objectives are at stake and the urgency they are seen
to have by U.S. commanders. The U.S. Army’s NTC
understands this tension and knows that officers value
their relationships with Iraqis sometimes to the point
of subordinating immediate objectives. Its negotiation
training makes the point that cultural niceties are
important, but officers should stay focused on their
intended outcome.218 Following training on cultural
awareness, the NTC emphasizes that commanders
should be prepared to set aside the demands of cultural
norms when necessary to accomplish a task.219

59

PART III
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MILITARY
NEGOTIATION TRAINING

61

Proposed Training Program.
Part III offers a proposed training program for
the U.S. military designed with the demands of SSTR
operations in mind. It recommends that the negotiation
training curriculum offered by the U.S. military to its
deploying soldiers include training in the principles,
techniques, and approaches discussed in Part II. These
techniques are not meant to replace the current emphasis
on preparation or the system of preparation developed
by the military’s combat training centers. Such focus
on preparation, situational awareness, and rehearsal is
appropriate and essential to negotiating effectively in
the complex SSTR environment.220 The current training
seems to assume, however, that thorough preparation
on the substance of the issues involved in the negotiation
will translate into effective execution. The negotiation
experience of military officers in Iraq, in addition to
a substantial body of negotiation research, suggests
otherwise. Current training does not teach U.S. military
negotiators how to strategize for the negotiation or how
to negotiate. Yet successful negotiation is a skill that
can be developed through effective training.221 These
recommendations would enhance the current training
regime by providing soldiers and commanders with
additional tools, techniques, and simulated experience
to utilize that preparation more effectively.
Research into negotiators as learners suggests that
a superior way for negotiators to learn from their
experiences is to practice comparing the structures of
different cases or situations instead of analyzing just one
case at a time.222 This learning approach is particularly
appropriate for the situational training exercises
conducted during predeployment training at CTCs
such as the NTC, but it requires time to conduct more
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than one structured, evaluated negotiation simulation
so that the commanders, staff officers, and junior
leaders can learn from multiple cases and situations.
The NTC currently conducts only one negotiation as
part of its negotiation training module.
The proposed training program lasts a minimum of
3 days. It includes reading assignments, some lectures,
and individual as well as supervised preparation.
Brief reading assignments should be read before
each day of the training that provide the foundation
for the day’s lecture(s) and exercises. The program
primarily consists, however, of simulated negotiation
exercises that are designed to teach the fundamental
techniques and skills of effective negotiation. Critical
to any negotiation training program is the opportunity
to evaluate and review each negotiation and receive
critique from trainers experienced in negotiation
themselves. This provides the students and trainers
opportunities to identify what worked, what did not
work, and why certain outcomes were reached, as well
as to compare results with other negotiators and with
prior negotiation simulations. This training program
utilizes the same teaching principles utilized by most
military training programs: provide a foundation in
the basic principles, conduct simulated exercises, and
follow it with an after action review.
A proposed agenda for the training program is
described below.223 The particular negotiation cases
used in the simulated exercises can be drawn from a
number of academic sources that have developed and
tested cases exclusively for training and education
purposes. It is important to use such cases, because,
much like military battle drills, each one deliberately
focuses on specific and fundamental techniques,
procedures, and skills. Over the course of 3 days,
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the case-based exercises build a negotiator’s skill set
and provide experience in negotiating under various
circumstances presenting different challenges.
Day 1: Preparation, Strategy, and Context. The
first day should include (1) interactive introductory
lecture on the fundamentals of negotiation practice
and theory and the components, structure, and
potential outcomes of negotiations; (2) interactive
lecture on, and supervision of, small group
preparation for negotiations, including an emphasis
on the many contextual factors a negotiator should
consider; and (3) two negotiation simulations with
review and evaluation. Officers in training negotiate
with each other in the roles provided by the cases.
The cases negotiated on this day are ones that focus
on preparation and understanding the negotiation’s
context, including negotiation-specific factors such as
the parties’ interests, options for both parties, obstacles
to negotiated agreement, the negotiator’s desired
endstate and priorities, the relationships involved, the
parties’ alternatives, and other issues. Also important
will be the political and economic environment,
religious and tribal considerations, the negotiator’s
commander’s intent, rules of engagement, and other
mission requirements.
Day 2: Understanding and Managing Cultural
Differences. Prior to the second day, officers in the
course should conduct preparation for the morning’s
negotiation exercise. This day begins with small group
preparation for the exercise to provide students the
opportunity to see what they missed in preparing alone
the night before. Trainees then negotiate the case and
evaluate their negotiation in pairs and in a small group.
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The day includes a lecture on understanding, managing,
and adapting to cultural differences in negotiation.
The afternoon negotiation simulation should provide
practice in the techniques and awareness suggested
above to manage the impact of cultural differences in
negotiation.
This day should also include a short lecture on
cognitive bias. Given the complex cross-cultural
environment defined by the presence of military
force and power, U.S. military negotiators would
benefit from exposure to and training in the role of
cognitive and social bias in negotiation. Militarycivilian SSTR interactions are ripe environments for
such cognitive biases as selective attention, belief
perseverance, representativeness and availability
heuristics, the base-rate fallacy, attributional bias,
self-serving bias, and negotiator overconfidence,
among others.224 Some degree of understanding of
these psychological processes should assist military
negotiators in avoiding the worst pitfalls of such
cognitive errors if they are made aware of what these
biases are, how they are generated, and what effect
they have on decisionmaking and negotiation. For
instance, the SSTR environment increases the risks that
both soldiers and civilians will misattribute ill-will,
deceit, or bad motives.225 Cultivating a critical selfawareness toward cultural stereotypes, capacity for
nationally- and organizationally-derived biases, and
one’s own ethnocentrism is critically important in the
complex SSTR environment in which U.S. officers are
operating.226
Day 3: Exercising Power Effectively. The third
day starts with a lecture on the principles, techniques,
and approaches discussed earlier. The negotiation
should start with a focus on the parties’ interests
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and combining power moves with interest-based
problem-solving. It includes discussion of the practical
benefits of focusing in negotiations on interests and
cooperative tactics, instead of exclusively on power
and competitive tactics. The lecture should encourage
soldiers and commanders to include an analysis (in their
preparation) of the tactical benefits of approaching the
negotiation with a focus on interests, so that soldiers
will consciously make strategic, informed decisions
about how any given negotiation is conducted.227
This lecture should include emphasis on proven
negotiation techniques such as listening, asking
questions, redirecting discussions away from powerbased or adversarial communications, and avoiding
reciprocation of threats. It should be followed by
preparation for and negotiation of a case, with evaluation
and review afterwards. Another negotiation exercise
should be conducted in the afternoon to reinforce the
day’s principles and techniques by presenting new,
challenging elements to the negotiation.
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PART IV
CONCLUSION
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The dramatic change over the last 3 years in the U.S.
Army’s training regime for units preparing to deploy
to Iraq highlights two developing realities. First, civilmilitary relations and negotiations have come to play
a more substantial role in the daily operations of U.S.
military units in Iraq and Afghanistan. Second, the U.S.
military has started to adapt to the mission it has been
charged with executing as that mission has changed
from early 2003 until now. That mission now requires
a set of skills and outcomes that are very different
from the traditional warfighting for which soldiers are
trained. It has meant that many soldiers and officers
spend a significant amount of their time interacting
with civilian crowds and individuals, especially civilian
leaders such as mayors, sheiks, imams, mullahs, city
council members, school superintendents, police chiefs,
and other government officials.
Most of the officers interviewed felt they were not
prepared to negotiate in Iraq, but those who deployed
to Iraq most recently have benefited from the military’s
learning and adaptation to the new SSTR environment
it faces there.228 Those officers involved in the initial
invasion of Iraq who were afterwards tasked with
stabilizing the country and beginning reconstruction
were not trained to operate in an SSTR context or to
negotiate with Iraqis.229 The Army has learned from
the experience of these units and those deployed since
then. Through its Center for Army Lessons Learned
and various schools and combat training centers, it
continues to learn from soldiers’ experience in Iraq
as they participate in such a highly complicated SSTR
operation.
This has not meant, however, that the military’s
training has always reflected the missions that
soldiers and their leaders are asked to accomplish.230
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The lessons of past Peace Operations and Stability
and Support Operations did not inform the training
for most soldiers deployed to Iraq, although it was
available. The Army had studied SSTR-like operations
extensively prior to OIF had and recognized many of
the same lessons from those operations as it has recently
observed—and in some cases had to relearn—in Iraq.231
Similarly, U.S. Army doctrine exists that has been
based on the best practices and theory of negotiation
research and literature.232 The Army’s graduate
schools have experts in the field and offer educational
courses in negotiation.233 The Army’s field manual for
stability and support operations acknowledges that
negotiation training is essential for officers serving in
SSTR operations and that predeployment training is
the “preferred approach.” It suggests that officers take
a 3- to 5-day course introducing basic concepts and
applying them in a series of exercises.234
Yet the NTC’s predeployment training is 2 to 3 hours
long, and none of the officers interviewed had been
provided any other negotiation training, except for a
civil affairs officer whose civil affairs course included
4 days of negotiation education. The interviews
conducted for this research and observations made at
the NTC suggest that the link between written military
guidelines for negotiation and available expertise in
negotiation education, on the one hand, and missionspecific training, on the other, is rather weak. That
link should be strengthened, so that those who train
deploying soldiers to negotiate have themselves
received an education in negotiation and are applying
the best of existing doctrine and negotiation literature
to their training curriculum.
This monograph has provided an analysis of
negotiations in SSTR operations between U.S. military
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officers and local civilian and military leaders. Based
on the experiences of officers recently redeployed
to the United States, three elements of negotiation
exercise focus on military-civilian negotiations in
SSTR operations. Context, cultural difference, and the
interplay between “power” and “interests” influence
substantially and in unique ways the conduct of such
negotiations and suggest several lessons for practice.
In their own ways, culture and power are each
dependent on numerous factors that can alter their
relative influence on the negotiators’ conduct.
The officers’ interviews demonstrate the
thoughtfulness with which many officers approached
their negotiations with civilians. Most were not
trained or prepared for them, but during their time in
Iraq, they adapted and learned. Many already knew
or learned effective lessons in Iraq; some seemed to
learn the wrong lessons, diminishing their negotiating
effectiveness. The lessons learned very often reflected
the conclusions of the negotiation literature, suggesting
that, despite the unique context of SSTR, negotiation
theory can be successfully applied in training to prepare
soldiers before they deploy, instead of hoping they
learn the right lessons once they arrive. For this reason,
this monograph offers several recommendations
that may be particularly relevant and helpful for
effective negotiation in this challenging and complex
environment.
The recommendations complement the military’s
existing doctrine and training. They apply the
negotiation literature and analysis of the negotiations
described in the officers’ interviews to the unique and
complex environment of SSTR operations in which U.S.
officers are negotiating to achieve mission objectives.
Most importantly, the recommendations advise the
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U.S. military to expand its negotiation training in time,
content, and in the officers and NCOs who receive such
training.
These recommendations would be helpful if
integrated into the military’s predeployment training for
SSTR operations. The U.S. Army NTC’s new negotiation
training is an important development. The new training
reflects a recognition at the military’s premier combat
training facility of the role that civil-military relations,
including negotiation, play in the complex mission of
stabilizing, securing, transitioning, and reconstructing
a country mired in conflict. The current training is
essential but not sufficient for successful negotiation
in SSTR operations. As a result, the monograph offers
training recommendations that are consistent with, and
would enhance and complement, the current offering
at the NTC, U.S. military training centers, and units’
own predeployment training.
In Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. officers and NCOs
have negotiated many thousands of times with local
leaders while pursuing tactical and operational
objectives that affect the strategic import of the U.S.
missions in those countries. The aggregate success
or failure of these negotiations have an impact—
sometimes immediate, more often over time—on the
success or failure of the entire mission. For this reason,
the practice of negotiating with civilians should be
given more attention by the U.S. Army and Marine
Corps. Transformation of the U.S. military requires
adaptation to the types of operations it may continue
to be called upon to perform. Negotiation is more likely
than ever to play a significant part in military operations
overseas. As it does, negotiation training, education,
and research will become more important for the U.S.
Army and Marines. Improvement in military-civilian

74

negotiating will promote more tactical and operational,
if not also strategic, success in the increasingly complex
missions of the 21st century.
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APPENDIX
THE U.S. ARMY NATIONAL TRAINING
CENTER (NTC) AND NTC NEGOTIATION
TRAINING
NTC Predeployment Training.
The National Training Center (NTC) has an 800member Operations Group responsible for conducting
training classes; planning and designing simulation
exercises; and—during the exercises—observing,
coaching, mentoring, and evaluating. After each
engagement with insurgents or civilians, these trainers
provide informal coaching and feedback in After
Action Reviews (AAR). At the end of the exercises,
they provide formal AARs to the unit and its leaders.
Trainers visit Iraq and Afghanistan on missions to
gather best practices, understand emerging challenges,
and gather more information about problems faced by
troops in theater. Combat veterans who served tours in
Iraq or Afghanistan comprise 85 percent of the NTC’s
trainers. They integrate new lessons and information,
as well as their personal experience, into the training.
They also integrate lessons learned from the U.S.
Army’s Center for Lessons Learned.
Army units that train at the NTC spend 3 weeks at
the base, the first of which includes a 3-hour negotiation
and cultural training for commanders and their staff
officers.235 The live simulation exercises occupy the
entire second and third weeks of training. The unit
deploys into the desert of the NTC charged with
accomplishing a mission and operating as if it were
in Iraq. Situated in the middle of the Mojave desert,
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the NTC has 12 mock Iraqi villages, an Islamic shrine,
cave complexes, and 1,600 role players representing
Iraqi civilians and insurgents. Of the role players, 250
are Iraqi nationals, most of whom speak fluent Arabic.
These Iraqis play the most important 127 of 2,200
distinct roles available, each of which has a personal
background and history, job, residence, as well as
familial and social relationships and associations with
other role players. The 127 key roles represent the
mayors, sheiks, town council members, imams, and
police chiefs.
Negotiations take place throughout the 2-week live
exercise. Junior officers or squad leaders frequently
interact with mayors or sheiks. Battalion commanders
or the brigade commander often meet with the mayors
and sheiks individually or as a group. Negotiation is,
as one leader at the NTC said, a bridge between kinetic
and nonkinetic operations: failed negotiations may
turn nonkinetic operations into kinetic ones.236 This
was demonstrated starkly in one negotiation I observed
during a recent NTC training rotation.237
NTC Negotiation Training.
This section describes the NTC’s negotiation training
and the process and system it teaches U.S. military
commanders, their staff officers, and subordinates to
use when negotiating with civilian leaders in Iraq.238
The training begins with an approximately half-hour
session on cultural awareness designed to complement
the negotiation training and delivered by instructors
from the Defense Language Institute (DLI). It includes
an overview of the cultural norms, differences, and
factors that soldiers should take into account when
negotiating in Iraq. This is followed by an approximately
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half-hour presentation on negotiating and an hour or
two conducting a simulation. In total, officers spend a
maximum of 3 to 4 hours in negotiation training.
Preparation. Preparation is the cornerstone of
NTC negotiation training. The system of preparation
it teaches for negotiations is an adapted version of
the military decisionmaking process (MDMP), which
requires commanders to take all relevant factors into
account, wargame potential alternative outcomes,
and make decisions and judgment calls based on that
analysis. It tracks the standard mission preparation
and analysis used by the U.S. Army to prepare for any
tactical engagement. This, by design, should account for
conflicting priorities and tension between immediate
objectives and long-term ones. Done properly, it will
include all relevant interests and priorities, information
about and dynamics of the area, and potential strategies,
alternatives, and options.239 The commander and
staff wargame the negotiation beforehand, analyzing
what courses of action the commander is willing
to take to meet his objectives. The commander will
then be prepared to make informed judgments in the
negotiation based on overall objectives for his mission
in that area.
To support this preparation, the NTC provides and
teaches officers to use its “Leader Preparation Sheet”
when preparing for negotiations in Iraq.240 A completed
sheet is the product of an integrated staff process in
which members of the battalion or brigade commander’s
staff fill in the parts of the sheet relevant to their area
of responsibility. The preparation sheet provides a
framework for a comprehensive mission analysis by
demanding a thorough understanding of the local
economy and industry, religious and tribal dynamics,
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educational institutions, civil law enforcement, former
military regime elements, and government and civic
institutions in the commander’s area of responsibility.
This includes a cultural and ethno-religious analysis of
the particular area.241 The sheet requires staff officers to
develop and fill in a negotiation strategy, information
operation themes, mission intent, talking points,
sequence of events in the negotiation, possible impasse
issues, offers, negotiation points, exit strategy, and the
promises made at the last meeting.242
The NTC teaches that the preparation sheet should
stimulate thinking about a negotiation strategy, an
agenda, and the potential directions the negotiation
could take, including things that could derail it. NTC’s
lead negotiations trainer notes that the overall strategy
and preparation should suit the officer who will be
conducting the negotiation, and the process requires
commanders and their staffs to identify intended
outcomes that are suitable and feasible. NTC training
emphasizes that every meeting with a civilian leader
should have an intended outcome.243 The premise of
the NTC’s preparation system is that a commander,
armed with all of the relevant information and focused
on his intended outcome, has everything he needs to
negotiate successfully. This is an assumption that will
be challenged below.
Tracking Promises. The NTC’s negotiation training
also focuses on the promises that soldiers make to
civilian leaders, because of the importance that keeping
promises has to credibility. The NTC teaches soldiers
to track carefully all promises or perceived promises
they make in any negotiation. During the 2-week
live exercise, NTC trainers copy every promise made
by a unit and its officers or squad leaders. The unit
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is evaluated on how many of those promises it kept.
The NTC teaches that promises kept are a powerful
negotiating tool because a U.S. military negotiator can
remind his Iraqi counterpart about the promises that
his unit has kept—for instance, the schools built, wells
dug, joint U.S.-Iraqi patrols conducted.244
Perceived promises are a particular challenge. NTC
training instructs officers to finish every negotiation
with an explicit review of commitments to clarify
what was promised, as well as what may have been
perceived as promised but to which the officer did not
commit. Finally, soldiers are instructed to write down
their promises to enable consistent tracking of those
commitments.
Rehearsal. The NTC trains officers to rehearse
before negotiating with Iraqi civilians. This parallels
the rehearsal element of the MDMP. A commander’s
rehearsal with his interpreter is a critical aspect of this
pre-negotiation rehearsal.245
After NTC negotiation and cultural awareness
presentations, officers prepare for and conduct
negotiations with DLI instructors who play mayors and
sheiks. Battalion commanders and their staffs prepare
for the mock negotiation using the preparation sheet.
NTC trainers observe the negotiation, and afterwards
the trainer and DLI instructor provide feedback. The
staff observes the negotiation via closed circuit TV and
provides feedback along with the NTC trainer and DLI
instructor. It also provides an opportunity for the staff
to test how well they prepared their commander.
Negotiation Techniques and Tactics. NTC emphasis
on preparation reflects its view that negotiations
should be treated as any other tactical mission and
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may explain why the training focuses on the system
of preparation and not on effective negotiation
techniques. Its negotiation training generally does not
include negotiation tactics or techniques, but it does
include brief discussion of things to do and not do
during a negotiation. They include, for instance, do
not lie or bluff; do not rush off to the next meeting;
do not promise anything outside of your control; finish
on time; do not tell jokes; only make threats if you can
and will follow through; watch body language; do
not have side conversations; and finish with a review
of agreements. This is one area of the training that, if
enhanced, could provide officers with a set of useful
and practical negotiation skills that they can use
as a complement to the Leader Preparation Sheet’s
structural preparation approach.
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1. SSTR is the comprehensive U.S. Government term for
operations following conflict that are necessary to lead to
sustainable peace, while advancing U.S. interests. See Department
of Defense (DoD) Directive No. 3000.05: Military Support for
Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,
November 28, 2005, idem. See also National Strategy for Victory in
Iraq, Washington, DC: National Security Council of the United
States, November 2005.
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the form of Stability and Support Operations (SASO), the goals of
which are typically to provide the local population with security,
to restore essential services, to meet humanitarian needs, and to
develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a
viable economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust
civil society. DoD Directive; See also Headquarters, Department
of the Army Field Manual 3-07, Stability Operations and Support
Operations, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
2003, (hereafter SASO Field Manual); Department of the Army
Field Manual 3-0, Operations, Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 2001. SSTR also includes reconstruction operations.
Operations comparable to the ones in which the U.S. military is
currently engaged are also known as peace operations, stability
operations, and/or stabilization and reconstruction operations.
See Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson, eds., Transforming for
Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, No. 31, Washington,
DC: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National
Defense University, 2004; Symposium Report, Stability Operations:
Where We Are and the Road Ahead, Washington, DC: U.S. Army
Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, U.S. Department
of State, United States Institute of Peace, December 13-14,
2004; Brian G. Watson, Reshaping the Expeditionary Army to Win
Decisively: The Case for Greater Stabilization Capacity in the Modular
Force, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army
War College, 2005.
3. See “Operation Iraqi Freedom Stability Operations-Support
Operations, Information Operations, Civil Military Operations,
Engineer, Combat Service Support,” Initial Impressions Report No.
04-13, Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons
Learned, May 2004, pp. ii-iii (hereafter 2004 CALL Report). This
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may change in the future, however, as DoD determines its plan
for Iraq, which may include consolidating troops in Iraq on large
superbases as it attempts to transition security responsibility
increasingly to Iraqis. See Michael Hirsch, “Stuck in the Hot Zone:
Don’t Dream about Full Exits. The Military is in Iraq for the Long
Haul,” Newsweek, May 1, 2006.
4. See Binnendijk and Johnson, p. 31 (concluding that what the
Army and Marine Corps can do in the post-conflict environment
is as important as what they do in war; “Rumsfeld Acknowledges
U.S., Insurgents Met: Confirmation Follows Newspaper Account
of ‘Face-to-Face’ Meeting,” The Associated Press, June 27, 2005,
available at www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8359553/.
5. For more on how negotiations, as civil-military interactions,
can be of strategic importance, see Binnendijk and Johnson, p. 89.
6. Ibid., p. 3.
7. For an example of increasing awareness within the military
of the different demands of nonlethal operations, see White Paper
on Nonlethal Weapons, Ft. Benning, GA: Firepower Division,
Directorate of Combat Developments, U.S. Army Infantry
Center.
8. By one account, one-third of the U.S. troops currently
deployed to Iraq trained at the NTC. See Dexter Filkins and John F.
Burns, “Mock Iraqi Villages in Mojave Prepare Troops for Battle,”
The New York Times, May, 1, 2006. The NTC is the largest of the U.S.
Army’s three major CTCs and the only accredited joint military
training facility. The other two CTCs are the Joint Readiness
Training Center at Fort Polk, Alabama (JRTC), and the Joint
Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany (JMRC).
Although the monograph does not explore training conducted
by the U.S. Marines and is focused on the training conducted
by the largest of the Army’s major combat training centers, the
description provides a representative picture of how soldiers who
will inevitably find themselves negotiating with Iraqi civilian
leaders are trained for just such a new and manifestly different
mission. The NTC has trained active duty Army, National Guard,
and Marine units for deployment to Iraq.
9. The author visited the NTC between February 27, 2006, and
March 2, 2006, and observed the 3d Stryker Brigade Combat Team,
2d Infantry Division from Fort Lewis, Washington, during the last
few days of its 2-week live exercise. The unit deployed to Iraq (for
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the second time) in the summer of 2006. Much of the information
about the NTC was provided by author’s notes from a Command
Briefing delivered by Major Keith Jarolimek, Secretary of the
General Staff, National Training Center, U.S. Army, February
28, 2006, and Interview with Major John Clearwater, U.S. Army,
at National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, February 28,
2006.
10. For an additional description of the evolution of the
Army’s training, with particular emphasis on the NTC and focus
on counterinsurgency training, see Filkins and Burns.
11. Interview with Major “A,” U.S. Army, at NTC, Fort Irwin,
California, March 2, 2006, discussing the enhanced focus on
information operations.
12. Negotiation observed by the author on February 28, 2006,
at “Medina Wazul,” a mock Iraqi town at the NTC.
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case in Iraq, as the United States pushes to hand over control of
the country to Iraqis and Iraqi security forces.
131. “[T]here’s a lot of negotiating power when you’re sitting
at a table, like we are, say with an interpreter over here and right
98

in front of you, in between us, is an M16.” Interview with “K,” p.
11.
132. See, e.g., Interview with “F,” p. 46, discussing threats to
discontinue funding; Interview with “H,” discussing negotiations
with local sheik seeking release of prisoners in which Walsh kept
sheik waiting for 30-60 minutes as demonstration of power and
refused to release the prisoners.
133. See Zartman and Rubin, “Power and Practice,” pp. 16-17;
Zartman and Rubin, “Symmetry and Assymmetry,” pp. 275-277,
providing support for the proposition that negotiators with high
relative power tend to behave exploitatively.
134. Interview with “I,” p. 13.
135. This is a classic example of “BATNA bashing.” See
Mnookin, Beyond Winning, p. 25.
136. Interview with “C,” p. 3.
137. Interview with “F,” p. 34.
138. Interview with “H,” pp. 23-24.
139. See Zartman, “Structure,” p. 76, citations omitted.
140. Interview with “G,” pp. 5-7.
141. Ibid., p. 6.
142. Ibid., p. 5.
143. Ibid., p. 6.
144. “Much of power is a matter of perception . . .,” Zartman
and Rubin, “Power and Practice,” p. 13. Exploring the perception
of power is more useful than trying to define a static objective
reality of power between the parties, because perceptions govern
the negotiators’ behavior. Ibid., pp. 13-14.
145. Ibid., p. 13 (discussing power as “a perceived relation.”)
146. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Conflict
Resolution: Cognitive Perspective,” Arrow et al., eds., Barriers
to Conflict Resolution, pp. 44, 46-50, discussing optimistic
overconfidence bias; Interview with “B,” p. 3, suggesting that
many fellow Marines make this mistake.
147. I raise the issue of cognitive bias because the intensity of the
SSTR environment and the incredible amount of new information
faced by U.S. soldiers in such an environment, including cultural
differences, provide such a ripe set of circumstances for potentially
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clouded judgment. See Morris and Gelfand, p. 45. The potential
for tactical mistakes due to bias is high because of the sometimes
overwhelming information-processing demands inherent in
negotiating in a war zone with civilians of another culture. Ibid.
For an excellent and more general review of the current state
of research on cognition and biases in negotiation, see Leigh
Thompson et al.
148. See Crane and Terrell, Reconstructing Iraq, pp. 43-45; see,
generally, Binnendijk and Johnson.
149. Resorting to force reflects a failure to resolve the dispute or
find an agreement, and while that may sometimes be a necessary
result of an interaction in the tense and often violent environment
of an SSTR operation, using force because negotiation failed
usually represents “a failure of skill, a failure of will, or a dearth
of creativity on the part of one or more of the disputants.” Robert
C. Bordone and Michael L. Moffitt, “Perspectives on Dispute
Resolution,” Moffitt and Bordone, eds., The Handbook of Dispute
Resolution, 2005, pp. 1, 11.
150. This is supported by research that shows that the perception
of power symmetry or asymmetry is related to elements such as
force, resources, and reputation. See Zartman and Rubin, “Power
and Practice,” p. 13.
151. Analysis of the negotiations discussed in the interviews
confirms this. Most of the negotiations in which officers threatened
force or used indicia of force to influence their counterparts were
negotiations related to security concerns. Generally, the officers
did not use the same tactics in the many negotiations they
discussed that concerned reconstruction or transition to Iraqi civil
government, although they sometimes still characterized their
power as being their military power to coerce.
152. By his control of funds, for instance. His power relative
to the Iraqi(s) with whom he is negotiating is likely to be reduced
by, for instance, the Iraqi town council’s control of prioritizing
reconstruction projects as part of the transition to Iraqi sovereignty,
to which the U.S. military is committed. This reflects research that
suggests that aggregate power, in this case the military power to
coerce and control, is not as important as issue-specific power in a
particular negotiation, in this case decisions about reconstruction
in the town. See Salacuse, p. 261.

100

153. See Zartman and Rubin, “Symmetry and Asymmetry,” p.
284, citing relationships as the last of three constraints on a strong
party’s power.
154. “There were some people who made it absolutely clear
through every negotiation that they were only negotiating with
the U.S. Army because we were the people that were there with
the firearms all over Iraq.” Interview with “E,” p. 24.
155. The U.S. military negotiator’s power to negotiate an
outcome may be detached from his military power.
156. See Interview with “K,” pp. 11-12, concluding that the
military power—the show of weaponry and equipment—was
inevitable and obvious but as an effect on the negotiation was
limited to keeping the discussion civil, to “a low key, never very
heated.”
157. There will be negotiations for which a strategy based on
power may have advantages, but they tend to be more rare than
most negotiators think. See Lytle et al., pp. 41-42.
158. For general suggestions and lessons on using power, as
either a weak or strong party to a negotiation, see Salacuse, pp.
255-269.
159. See Interview with “L,” noting that it is important to know
when to use and exert power and when not to, based on a judgment
that requires understanding the entire situation; Interview with
Gregory, p. 45, stating that there is a time and place for using force
and power, and one should not be afraid to use it appropriately
when appropriate but must know the relevant limits and rules of
engagement.
160. The U.S. Army recognizes this. In an initial review of civilmilitary operations and cultural considerations in Operation Iraqi
Freedom, it recommends that soldiers weigh short term tactical
gains against long term implications and second-order effects.
2004 CALL Report, p. 42.
161. Interview with “I,” pp. 11-12.
162. See, e.g., Lytle et al., p. 40.
163. See Raymond A. Millen, The Yin and Yang of Counterinsurgency in Urban Terrain, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005, unpublished manuscript on
file with the author; Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, Insurgency
and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat
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U.S. Army War College, 2004; 2004 CALL Report, pp. ii-iii.
164. See note 30.
165. See Mnookin, Beyond Winning, p. 240; Lytle et al., p. 43.
166. See generally Fisher, Getting to Yes, p. 98; See also Lytle et
al., p. 43.
167. This emphasis on taking an interest-based approach while
maintaining an eye on power, culture, and context recognizes
the limits of an exclusive focus on interests in the complicated
cross-cultural and militarized environment of SSTR operations.
But see Avruch, pp. 395, 404, arguing that strictly interest-based
bargaining is limited in international humanitarian negotiations.
168. See Jeffrey M. Senger, “Tales from the Bazaar: InterestBased Negotiations Across Cultures,” Negotiation Journal, July
2002, pp. 233-234.
169. See Interview with “H,” pp. 25, 27, volunteering that
listening was the most important thing he did in negotiations.
170. See ibid.
171. Lytle et al., p. 34; see, generally, Ury et al.
172. Lytle et al., pp. 33-34, citing Ury et al.
173. Ibid., pp. 34-38, finding more emphasis on rights and
power in the first and third quarters of the negotiation than in the
second and fourth quarters.
174. See Interview with “L.”
175. See Interview with “E”, pp. 7-8.
176. Ibid., p. 8.
177. See Interview with “B,” pp. 3-6.
178. Ibid., pp. 5-8.
179. Ibid., p. 9.
180. Ibid., pp. 4-8.
181. This approach combining power and interests foci may be
just as effective at redirecting negotiations to the parties’ interests
as an exclusively interests-based approach. See Lytle et al., p. 44.
182. See Lytle et al., p. 44, citing H. G. Lerner, The Dance of
Anger, 1985.
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183. See Michael L. Moffitt, “Disputes As Opportunities to
Create Value,” Michael L. Moffitt and Robert C. Bordone, eds.,
The Handbook of Dispute Resolution, 2005, pp. 173, 176, arguing
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realities of disputes; James K. Sebenius, “International Negotiation
Analysis,” Victor A. Kremenyuk ed., International Negotiation:
Analysis, Approaches, Issues, 2nd Ed., San Francisco, CA: JosseyBass, 2002, pp. 229, 242 (hereafter Sebenius, International
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to improve the effectiveness of negotiation.
184. See, e.g., Lytle et al., p. 43.
185. See, e.g., Pruitt, p. 91; Sebenius, International Negotiation,
p. 230.
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causing a negative conflict spiral that jeopardizes the outcome,
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187. For an example of a positive approach, see Interview with
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negotiations in terms of counterpart’s interests.
188. See Brett, Negotiating Globally, p. 115. This is also called
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basic interests but willing to engage in flexible problem-solving.
See Pruitt, p. 87.
189. See Lytle et al., p. 48; For a recent example, see David S.
Cloud, “In Bid to Rebuild Razed Bridge, Recovery and War Vie in
Iraq,” The New York Times, April 6, 2006, p. 1.
190. See, e.g., Lytle et al., p. 48.
191. The approach could therefore be more accurately
understood as a productive way to manage the negotiator’s
dilemma described by Lax and Sebenius or the tension between
creating and distributing value described by Mnookin et al. The
dilemma reflects the tension between competitive moves to
“claim value” for the negotiator’s benefit and cooperative moves
to “create value” that enlarges the pie. See Lax and Sebenius,
Manager as Negotiator; Mnookin, Beyond Winning. This tension is
inescapable and “affects virtually all tactical and strategic choice.”
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Lax and Sebenius, Manager as Negotiator, p. 30. Competitive and
cooperative elements of a negotiation, like power and interests,
are “inextricably entwined.” Ibid. Tactics to claim or distribute
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power discussed above, risks a negative result. “Claiming” tactics
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of threats and counterthreats. Ibid., p. 246.
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between “contending” and “problem-solving.” See Pruitt, p. 86-88.
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Moffitt, p. 181-184.
193. See Lewicki, pp. 54-55; Allred, p. 82.
194. See Kopelman and Olekalns, p. 378, citing research that
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195. See Roderick M. Kramer, “The Dark Side of Social Context:
The Role of Intergroup Paranoia in Intergroup Negotiations,”
Gelfand and Brett, eds., The Handbook of Culture and Negotiation,
p. 220.
196. “[S]ocial relations are really everything . . . your word is
everything, and you don’t get anywhere until you know somebody
. . . ” Interview with “H,” pp. 15, 42; See also Interview with “B,”
pp. 5, 6, noting that he never got information the first time he met
someone.
197. See Interview with “K,” p. 33; Interview with “E,” p. 22.
198. See Interview with “E,” pp. 22-23. This is consistent with
the negotiation literature. See Kopelman and Olekalns, p. 378.
199. See Interview with “E,” pp. 23-24.
200. See Interview with “H,” p. 36.
201. See Interview with “D,” pp. 19-20; Interview with “B,” pp.
5-6, stating that when he secured information it was only after a
relationship of some sort had been established.
202. Interview with “E,” p. 23.
203. For one officer, “I was just another soldier to them most of
the time. In only a few instances did I have the time to get to know
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Interview with “I,” p. 15.
204. Interview with “I,” p. 17; See also Metz and Millen, p. 51,
arguing that the new strategic environment requires sometimes
turning enemies into nonbelligerents, allies, and friends.
205. Interview with “K,” p. 26.
206. See Interview with “E,” pp. 22-24, “Everything that we
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not always mean being friends or being polite. Sometimes . . . we
were trying to demonstrate our position in the relationship as the
ones in authority and the ones that had power; that we would
not be screamed at in this meeting, or we would not be pushed
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demands.”
207. Some research suggests that outcomes may be
unnecessarily suboptimal because concern for the relationship
outweighs concern for the task. See Kopelman and Olekalns, p.
378.
208. See Kramer, pp. 221-227.
209. See ibid., p. 230. See discussion on pp. 32, 50-51. The
accuser and excuser biases may have particular relevance in this
situation. See Allred, p. 85.
210. See, e.g., Interview with “H,” pp. 13-14. Kramer cites the
need for more field research, including ethnographic research in
cross-cultural settings, that investigates paranoid cognition and
the role and development of trust in negotiations. Kramer, p.
231. This study tries to offer the qualitative research and “thick”
descriptions of conflicts and negotiations that he considers
“essential if we are to develop deeper and more nuanced
understandings of these important phenomena.” Ibid.
211. See Interview with “H,” pp. 13-15.
212. Ibid., pp. 14-15.
213. Ibid., p. 15. U.S. convoys regularly traveled through this
town on its own major through-street. The sheik never threatened
or suggested this, but Captain “H” suggested the possibility that
the sheik was running guns or bombs through the town.
[I]n the back of our minds at every negotiation, whether
it was with the sheik, the power company, or going into
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side they’re on, you know? You always wonder what
side they’re on. . . . it’s not like labor negotiations or
something where you know the person’s on the [other]
side. . . . But in these negotiations, you never knew if
they were good or bad . . . .[Y]ou didn't know if they
really wanted me dead or if they really cared about me
and wanted Iraq to be free and prosper. . . .
Ibid., p. 37.
214. See, e.g., Interview with “I.”
215. See Kopelman and Olekalns, p. 378, citing Kathleen
L. Valley et al., “Friends, Lovers, Colleagues, Strangers: The
Effects of Relationships on the Process and Outcome of Dyadic
Negotiations,” Robert J. Bies, Roy J. Lewicki, and Blair H. Sheppard,
eds., Research on Negotiation in Organizations, Greenwich, CT: Jai
Press, 1995, p. 5.
216. See, e.g., Interview with “E,” pp. 6-7.
217. See Interview with “F,” p. 38, suggesting that the U.S.
Army often does not push the envelope enough when it should,
because it stresses the importance of being culturally aware,
sensitive, and respectful. (He suggested it should sometimes say,
“Bullshit is bullshit, no matter where you’re at.”)
218. Interview with “M,” U.S. Army, at Fort Irwin, California,
March 2, 2006.
219. Ibid. See also training materials on file with Captain
Jonathan Velishka, NTC, Fort Irwin, California.
220. See Mnookin, Beyond Winning, pp. 28-34, arguing that
good preparation consists of identifying issues and thinking
about interests, contemplating potential opportunities for
“value creation,” knowing and improving one’s alternatives,
and establishing ambitious but realistic goals. The NTC’s lead
negotiation trainer believes that the negotiation preparation he
teaches decreases the need to be heavy-handed or forceful. “[Y]ou
can have a guy that goes in, is real smooth and understands the
IOP [integrated operational picture], and understands what he
can offer, and you have a very successful hour or 30 minutes. Or
he goes in too heavy-handed, hasn’t thought through his outcome,
and is demanding information on who is planning an IED, and
that’s a different outcome.” Interview with “M,” p. 20. However,
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as discussed elsewhere, preparation alone does not accomplish
this.
221. See, e.g., Paul W. Meerts, “Training of Negotiators,”
Kremenyuk, ed., International Negotiations, p. 455.
222. See Leigh Thompson, et al., “Avoiding Missed
Opportunities in Managerial Life: Analogical Training More
Powerful Than Individual Case Training,” Organizational Behavior
and Human Decision Processes, Vol. 82(I), 2000, pp. 60-75.
223. This proposed training program draws heavily on the
agenda for negotiation training programs conducted by the
Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School, which conducts
numerous negotiation training courses, one of which is a 5-day
course for professionals. The author particularly thanks Robert C.
Bordone, Deputy Director of the Harvard Negotiation Research
Project and Thaddeus R. Beal Assistant Clinical Professor of Law,
Harvard Law School for his assistance.
224. For an overview of these biases and their relevance to
international negotiations, see Christer Jönsson, “Cognitive
Theory,” Kremenyuk, ed., International Negotiation, p. 270. For
discussion of how perceptions shape negotiators’ behavior
and psychological, cultural and emotional forces can distort
decisionmaking, see Zartman and Rubin, “Symmetry and
Asymmetry,” pp. 271-290; Mnookin, Beyond Winning, pp. 156-172.
Sebenius and Avruch both discuss these biases in the context of
international, cross-cultural negotiations. See Sebenius, Caveats;
Avruch.
225. See Rubinstein, p. 35.
226. “Ethnocentrism can be a barrier. Must shed it to be
effective.” Interview with “I,” p. 16. See also Avruch, p. 406.
227. Appendix E of the U.S. Army’s Field Manual for Stability
and Support Operations provides a framework for preparing for
and conducting negotiations that affirms the recommendations
contained in this monograph, including the need to focus on
underlying interests. See SASO Field Manual, pp. E-0 to E-5.
This doctrinal document instructs soldiers preparing to negotiate
to focus on the interests of the parties and the relationships
involved, to consider alternative approaches to the negotiation,
to prevent incidents that destroy dialogue, and to be attuned
to cultural differences. It provides an eight-step procedure to
follow when negotiating that mirrors fundamental principles of
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negotiation literature discussed and recommended in this paper.
See ibid. This appendix should be disseminated more broadly and
utilized as a resource by officers and NCO’s preparing to deploy
to Iraq. The principles and procedures it recommends should
also be integrated into predeployment negotiation training, and
all NTC and other CTC trainers should read and understand its
recommendations.
228. Compare Interviews with “G,” “M,” with Interviews with
“E,” “D,” and “F.”
229. See, e.g., Interview with “G,” p. 23; See also 2004 CALL
Report, p. ii.
230. See Binnendijk and Johnson, p. 88. For instance, in the late
1990s, the Army considered two divisions to be no longer combat
ready because they had been deployed to peace operations in the
Balkans, yet this ignored the skills and experience that such units
developed during those missions—the very skills and experience
that would have been valuable for all U.S. forces in Iraq in 2003 to
the present. See ibid.
231. See, e.g., Douglas V. Johnson II, ed., Warriors in Peace
Operations; Mockaitis, Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations;
Symposium Report.
232. See SASO Field Manual, Appendix E; Section B:
Negotiation and Mediation, Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook
for Peace Operations, IV-15, June 16, 1997. The U.S. Army War
College’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI)
is the Army’s “center of excellence at mastering peace, stability,
and reconstruction operations at the strategic and operational
levels.” It recognizes the important role that negotiations play in
SSTR operations. See www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/divisions/pksoi/
politicalNeg.aspx. The PKSOI recently promoted on its website a
newly released manual published by the United Nations Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. See www.carlisle.
army.mil/usacsl/divisions/pksoi/index linking to Gerard McHugh
and Manuel Bessler, Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups:
A Manual for Practitioners, New York: United Nations, January
2006, at ochaonline.un.org/humanitariannegotiations/index.html.
233. The Army War College requires a 2-day negotiation
course for all of its students and offers a 30-credit graduate level
negotiation course that is highly subscribed and popular among
the officers attending the Army War College. See Telephone
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Interview with Professor James McCallum, U.S. Army War
College, Carlisle Barracks, November 22, 2005. The Civil Affairs
course at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, includes a negotiation module
for officers specializing in civil affairs. The Foreign Service Institute
offers a 1-week negotiation course. Other graduate schools and
career courses offered by the military education system may
offer some negotiation education as part of their curriculum.
Finally, a small group of select officers attend civilian professional
graduate schools in which they may take a negotiation course.
This negotiation education is distinct from training, however,
which prepares officers more specifically to execute missions.
Nor is negotiation included in mission-specific training except
to the extent that the combat training centers and individual
units have integrated it into their predeployment training. The
schools described above are generally for captains and above
who have already finished commanding a company. Most lowerlevel officers including platoon and company commanders are,
therefore, not armed with negotiation education or substantial
formal training before they find themselves having to negotiate in
tense and complex situations like the ones they face in Iraq.
234. See SASO Field Manual, p. E-5; Binnendijk and Johnson,
p. 88, criticizing the U.S. military’s training for continuing to focus
exclusively on the warfighting mission, which leaves little time to
acquire negotiation skills for the SSTR-like missions that follow.
235. This negotiation training is detailed below.
236. See author’s notes from Command Briefing. “Kinetic”
refers to lethal or potentially lethal operations involving live
fire and application of force. “Nonkinetic” refers to nonlethal
operations.
237. The author visited the NTC between February 27, 2006,
and March 2, 2006, and observed the 3d Stryker Brigade Combat
Team, 2d Infantry Division from Fort Lewis, Washington, during
the last few days of its 2-week live exercise. The unit deployed to
Iraq (for the second time) in the summer of 2006.
238. The training curriculum at the NTC was designed by
the NTC’s lead negotiation trainer using negotiation training
material developed originally by the JRTC in cooperation with
subject matter experts and combining it with his personal
experience in Iraq, as well as cultural expertise provided by the
Defense Language Institute. It was described by Captain Jonathan
Velishka, U.S. Army, NTC, Fort Irwin, California.
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239. For example, a common tension faced by U.S. military
negotiators is the frequent conflict between the immediate
objectives or task and the long-term objective of cultivating and
maintaining positive, productive working relationships with Iraqi
counterparts which are necessary to accomplish the U.S. military’s
long-term mission objectives.
240. Blank Leader Preparation Sheet, courtesy of Captain
Jonathan Velishka, lead cultural awareness and negotiation
trainer, U.S. Army NTC, Fort Irwin, California. The sheet is on
file.
241. It is a central emphasis of the training that to be effective at
negotiating both particular issues and over the long term, the U.S.
military officers and their soldiers cannot rely on basic cultural
awareness—the do’s and don’t’s—but must understand intimately
their area of operations. It is, as the NTC’s lead negotiation trainer
said, “all about homework.” Interview with “M,” p. 20.
242. Blank Leader Preparation Sheet.
243. See Interview with “M,” pp. 13-14, 15.
244. Ibid., p. 24.
245. Ibid., pp. 30-32.
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